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Abstract
For 30 years, federal courts have certified questions of state law to the Utah Supreme
Court. This thesis examines the history and utility of the process and recommends changes to the
process in the federal district court and in the Utah Supreme Court.
The current focus of federal judges in certifying questions is on utility for the case before
the court. But certification of questions from a federal court to a state court is an expression of
federalism—a humble acknowledgment by a federal authority which is often regarded as
supreme that the state is the proper and best authority to declare its own law. Certification of
questions is a rare instance of direct communication between state and federal courts, and a
chance for both systems to cooperate in resolution of a single case, in their respective roles.
Certification of legal questions from federal courts to state courts has emerged in the last
75 years. Similar purposes were accomplished previously in American law by very cumbersome
procedures, and antecedents existed in English law. From Florida’s adoption of the first statutory
certification procedure in 1945 through a 1960 U.S. Supreme Court endorsement of certification
and promulgation of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, all states except North
Carolina have adopted a certification procedure.
The Utah procedure and practice began in 1975 with a rule later found to violate the Utah
Constitution. But in 1984, a constitutional authorization paved the way for a valid process which
has been used regularly, and most frequently in the last three years since a justice of the Utah
Supreme Court became a district judge in the District of Utah.
Thirty years of experience with certification in Utah federal and state courts is thoroughly
examined in this thesis. Case histories and court practices demonstrate the usefulness of
certification in Utah. But the thesis also suggests changes to Utah certification, by adoption of a
new rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah; by changes to the applicable Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure; and by changed practices of judges and lawyers. This thesis can
serve as the basis for reflection, discussion and improvement between participants in the process
of certification.
This thesis also suggests other areas of study for the future, some related to Utah’s
experience and other more general topics.
Utah’s foundation for certification of questions from the federal court to the Utah
Supreme Court has been laid. And now the process can be refined and improved for the future.
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Overview of the Certification Process
This section of the thesis serves as an introduction for those unfamiliar with the process
of certification—delivering questions to a state appellate court by a court of another
jurisdiction. Those familiar with the process may skip this section. This section introduces some
terminology peculiar to certification.
The law of the state having the greatest relationship to the parties’ dispute usually must be
applied to resolve the dispute. Even if a case is filed in the court of another state or in a federal
court, the law of the state having the greatest relationship generally must be applied. So, courts
of one state (or a federal court) may attempt themselves to determine the applicable law by
research, if precedent exists, or by prediction if there is no precedent, or the courts may certify a
legal question to a court in the state of the governing law.
This thesis only discusses certification of legal questions to the Utah Supreme Court by
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the District Court for the District of Utah, and the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. The certification process has many stages as outlined
in these charts:

Federal Court with Lawsuit or Appeal
Legal question arises, dependent on Utah state law
Suggestion to certify is made by the court (“sua sponte”) or by a motion from a party
Court determines to certify, by an order granting the motion or by advising the parties in an order or
hearing
Attorneys and the judge draft facts and question to send to Utah Supreme Court
Judge signs and sends “certification order” to Utah Supreme Court with documents from court record

Utah Supreme Court
Court receives certification order
Court issues an order accepting or rejecting the question certified and requests documents from
federal court record
Court sets briefing schedule, receives briefs and holds argument (all these steps may be
modified)
After argument, court confers and assigns opinion to a justice (another justice may write a
separate opinion)
Justices issue opinion(s) answering questions (majority opinion controls)
Opinion(s) sent to federal court

Federal Court with Lawsuit or Appeal
Federal court applies answer of Utah Supreme Court
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Introduction
Certification is a unique opportunity for state and federal courts to directly interact,
though in a heavily formalized manner. When a federal court certifies a question to a state court,
the parties’ dispute is partially shared between two independent judicial systems. Other
circumstances in which a dispute is shared between the courts of two different sovereign
jurisdictions are very rare.
In certification, contrary to usual supremacy of federal over state systems, state courts set
the procedures federal courts must follow. And a state court always has discretion to refuse,
receive, and even reformulate the question from the federal court. In certifying a question to a
state court, a federal court acknowledges the sovereignty of the state and the presumed expertise
and right of a state court to interpret state law. Certification is a unique feature of American
federalism.
Certification from federal courts to state appellate courts is also an unusual process for
the state appellate court. Certification interactions are different than the exchanges between
courts of a single system, which are usually between a superior court and an inferior court. In
those instances, the superior court instructs, rejects, or approves the actions of the inferior court.
In certification, the responding court has a role delimited by the questioning court.
Certification interaction, where a responding court receives a narrow, certified question,
is similar to the role of an appellate court focused on a subset of issues raised in a trial court. But
certification, on a partially developed record, is very different than an appeal from a fully tried
case. In certification, the certifying court assesses the determinative nature of a question of state
law, formulates facts on which the state court will make a decision, and prepares a certification
order—before trial on the merits. Certification nearly places a state court in the position of
answering a hypothetical question, which is generally disfavored by courts.
Utah was an early adopter of certification. The Utah Supreme Court adopted a rule
permitting certification in 1975. But in 1981, after the roster of justices on the court had entirely
changed, the rule was found unconstitutional. Fortunately, other issues with the Judicial Article
in Utah’s Constitution resulted in a revision of that Article in 1984. The revision included
authorization for the Utah Supreme Court to respond to certified questions. A new statute and
court rule followed in 1986.
Since that time, Utah’s 30 years of experience with certification has created a rich
database of over 130 cases. We can examine the benefits and detriments of certification in
specific cases. 1

1

The reader is cautioned by a note appearing in a scholarly article over twenty years ago, relating the responses of
two judges to a survey on the issue of certification: “As to the value of this survey, two of the more interesting
comments provided by the respondents were: ‘This is a truly tedious subject about which I have not given three
minutes of thought in the last 22 years!’; and ‘This is a very interesting issue – AJS is to be complimented on
addressing it.’” Jona Goldschmidt, Certification of Questions of Law: Federalism in Practice, 2 n.1, American
Judicature Society (1995).
1

But certification is more than case-specific. Certification has institutional significance
that has not been emphasized as federal courts have considered certification to the Utah Supreme
Court. Certification recognizes the primary role of the Utah Supreme Court as the interpreter of
Utah law. While a federal court is empowered to interpret the law of any state or foreign
jurisdiction, certification expresses federalism, and recognizes the superior role of the Utah
Supreme Court in setting Utah precedent.
The unique nature of certification calls for careful consideration of its benefits, processes
and detriments, which this thesis undertakes. The practices of the Utah Supreme Court, the
various judges of the Utah federal district court and bankruptcy court, 2 and the panels of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals are reviewed. This thesis examines:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the types of cases and issues that have used certification;
the best stages of proceedings to seek certification;
the federal judges who most often suggest certification and grant motions to
certify;
the principles which have guided lawyers and judges as questions are formulated
for certification and included in certification orders;
the sua sponte use of certification of questions by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 13 cases, where nine of the answers have resulted in reversal of a trial
court decision;
the processes followed in the federal courts which certify questions to the Utah
Supreme Court;
the factors considered by the federal courts in granting certification, including
outdated factors still cited in certification decisions;
the role of Jill Parrish, former Utah Supreme Court justice and now federal district
judge in changing the use of certification by the district court;
the criteria which appear to have been used for the decision of the Utah Supreme
Court to accept, reject, or reformulate certified questions; and
the impact of certification on the case at issue, including delay from the
certification process and the role of certification in resolving the case.

If judges so choose, the data and analysis in this thesis may serve as a basis for direct
non-case related communication about certification between the state and federal courts.
This thesis recommends changes in the Utah certification process. A new local rule is
proposed for the federal district court. Changes are recommended to the 30-year-old Utah Rule
of Appellate Procedure on certification. These changes will better balance case specific and intergovernmental considerations. The rule proposals may be considered by the rules committees of
the respective courts.

2

The term “trial court” is sometimes used to include the federal district court and bankruptcy court in the District of
Utah.
2

Legal Context
The United States of America is unique in having dual sovereignties, with fifty state legal
and court systems and a single federal system which overlaps the fifty states geographically and,
in many instances, jurisdictionally. Federal courts may consider disputes arising under state law,
and some federal disputes, such as tax matters, depend on application of state law. A state or
federal court in one state may decide a case under the law of another state.
The web of interrelated systems requires courts whose regular work is with the law of the
sponsoring government to occasionally apply the law of a different sovereign. Conflict of law
rules determine how these courts select the law to apply. “Federal courts [after Erie R.R. Co. v
Tompkins 3] must, when a state law question is posed within the context of a federal case, apply
state substantive law as the rule of decision.” 4
After a court determines that the law of the state in which it sits should not apply, the
court proceeds into less familiar legal territory. A state or federal court in which a case is pending
is not engaged full-time in application of the law of another state; is not an integral and
constitutional part of that state’s legal system; is not as familiar with the culture and policies of
the other state; and, possibly most importantly, does not have the constitutional role as final
arbiter of that state’s law. The court in which the case is pending is, however, required to locate
authority and interpret it, or in some instances it may certify legal questions to a court of the
jurisdiction where the law originates.

The Development of Certification in the United States
Legal Precedent and Alternatives
The idea of certifying questions from one judicial system to another is not an American
invention:
The British Law Ascertainment Act of 1859 permitted a court in one part of the
British Commonwealth to remit a case for an opinion on a question of law to a
court in another part of the Commonwealth. The Foreign Law Ascertainment Act
of 1861 allowed questions of law to be certified between British courts and courts
of foreign countries, provided that each country had signed a convention
governing such procedure. 5

3

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

4

William G. Bassler and Michael Potenza, Certification Granted: The Practical and Jurisprudential Reasons Why
New Jersey Should Adopt a Certification Procedure, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 491, 491 (1998-1999).

5

Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. Legis. 127, 132
(1992).

3

These enactments were made long after the dissolution of ties between England and the
American colonies, so they were not part of the common law adopted in the colonies. But they
may have influenced the adoption of certification processes in the United States.
There was a federal statute of long standing which allows federal courts of appeal to
certify questions of law to the U.S. Supreme Court. 6 This procedure is no longer in use because
the Supreme Court has limited its caseload. 7 That could be an analog to certification from courts
of states or federal courts to the courts of states.
Before certification procedures were in place, American federal courts would take
alternative approaches when decisive questions of state law were presented on which the federal
court was unwilling to opine. The federal court could stay its proceedings and direct parties to
file a declaratory judgment action in a state court, if the state accepted such actions. 8 Or a federal
court could simply abstain from proceeding with the case, leaving the parties to re-file in another
court—or lack a remedy. Abstention was disfavored: “Abdication of the obligation to decide
cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest.” 9 Those interests were generally confined to comity and where a “federal constitutional
issue . . . might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of
pertinent state law.” 10
And declaratory actions were sometimes rejected. In United Services Life Insurance
Company v. Delaney 11 the Fifth Circuit instructed the parties to “initiate a proceeding in a Texas
court seeking a declaratory judgment about of the meaning of the pertinent clauses of the
respective insurance contracts, with a review of such judgment by a court of last resort of the
State of Texas.” 12 The parties did file the declaratory action, but were told by the Texas trial court
(which was affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court) that the declaratory case could not be heard
due to “a constitutional lack of power.” 13 “[T]he rendition of advisory opinions by courts is
unauthorized by our constitution . . . .” 14

6

28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006); see also Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda: Is There a Place for
Certification?, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1310 (2010).

7

Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100
Colum. L. Rev. 1643, 1712 (2000).

8

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959).

9

Allegheny Cty. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959).

10

Id. at 189.

11

328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1964).

12

Id. at 485.

13

United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1965).

14

Id. at 864.
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Florida First In Certification—and U.S. Supreme Court Commentary
Florida was the first state to adopt a procedure to accept questions certified from federal
courts. The 1945 Florida statute was followed by an implementing rule in 1961. 15 Before the rule
was adopted, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed the Fifth Circuit to use the statutory process, 16
and spoke in glowing terms about the procedure:
The Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of
authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a
statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state
law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision. Even without such a
facilitating statute we have frequently deemed it appropriate, where a federal
constitutional question might be mooted thereby, to secure an authoritative state
court's determination of an unresolved question of its local law. 17
The Supreme Court directed that the Fifth Circuit, on remand, use the procedure, 18 and the
Supreme Court used the procedure itself in later Florida cases decided in 1963. 19 These
endorsements were cited as motivation the formulation of the Uniform Certification of Questions
of Law Act (1967) (“Uniform Act (1967)”). 20

15

Bassler, supra n.4, at 494 n.13.

16

The Supreme Court noted that the promulgation of rules was not “a jurisdictional requirement for the
entertainment by the Florida Supreme Court of a certificate” from a federal court. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363
U.S. 207, 212 (1960).

17

Id. (citations omitted). When the Fifth Circuit invoked the process on remand, the procedure was upheld against a
challenged in the Florida Supreme Court. Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 94 n.233 (citing Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay,
133 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1961), rev’d, 319 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963), rev’d, 377 U.S. 180 (1964). The Fifth Circuit refused
to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s answer to the substantive question, but was in turn reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court.

18

See Clay, 363 U.S. at 213 (Black, J., dissent).

19

Dresner v. Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich. 375 U.S. 249 (1963).

20

“The Florida provision has also been used by the Supreme Court of the United States, Dresner v. City of
Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963) question answered 164 So.2d 208 (1964), and Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75, 249
(1963), questions answered 163 So.2d 276 (1964).” Uniform Act (1967) at Prefatory Note.

5

Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act
Dissatisfaction with abstention and the positive attention to the Florida example led to the
Uniform Act (1967). 21 Even before the Uniform Act was promulgated, three other states
followed Florida’s lead with legislation of their own. 22
“Prior to formulation of the Uniform Act [(1967)] . . . scholarly work had been done in
the area, primarily by Allan Vestal, then Professor of Law at the University of Iowa and one of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [which] formed the basis for many of the policies
ultimately realized in the U.L.A [Uniform Laws Annotated].” 23 A uniform law was needed
because “[u]niformity would make probable the greater use of certification. If attorneys and
judges are faced not with an unfamiliar act, but rather with a carbon of the act of their own states,
they will be more willing to use the device.” 24 The Uniform Act (1967) was “patterned in large
measure on Florida Appellate Rule 4.61.” 25
The Uniform Act (1967) was quite simple. It was drafted as a model legislative
enactment, unlike the 1995 revision which also contemplated enactment as a court rule. The
Uniform Act (1967) specified:
That a designated court could answer questions from specified courts that were
“questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in
the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no
controlling precedent in the decisions of the [specified appellate courts] of this state”; 26
That the process could initiate on motion or sua sponte (on the court’s own suggestion); 27
The contents of a certification order—a statement of relevant facts and “the questions of
law to be answered”; 28

21

Uniform Act (1967); 12 U.L.A. 86 (1996). The Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas has two boxes of
“materials related to drafting the Uniform Certification of Question of Law Act.”
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/taro/utlaw/00040/law-00040p30.html (last visited January 27, 2018).

22

Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for Reform, 18 J. Legis. 127, 133
n.44 (1992). The states were Hawaii, Maine, and Washington.

23

Id. at 131.

24

Uniform Act (1967) at Prefatory Note n.1.

25

Id. at Prefatory Note n.2.

26

Id. § 1.

27

Id. § 2.

28

Id. § 3.
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The form of an order and the method of transmitting it and a sufficient record to the
receiving court; 29
For an equal allocation of costs between the parties; 30
That the receiving court rules regarding briefs and argument would apply to certification
proceedings; 31
For transmittal of the state court opinion to the certifying court and the parties; 32
That specified courts of the enacting state could certify to other courts, on similar
grounds, 33 using the process of the receiving state; 34 and
Severability, 35 construction, 36 title, 37 and effective date. 38
After 25 years of experience with the Uniform Act (1967), Professor Ira Robbins
proposed a new act to remedy issues which had arisen in the states which had enacted the earlier
uniform act. 39 They had often enacted variants of the Uniform Act (1967) which in his view
were ill advised. His proposals included:
Restricting the power to answer questions to the highest state court, to avoid inefficiency
of a state appeal; 40
Ensuring that all federal courts and the highest court in a state may certify; 41

29

Id. § 4.

30

Id. § 5.

31

Id. § 6.

32

Id. § 7.

33

Id. § 8.

34

Id. § 9.

35

Id. § 10.

36

Id. § 11.

37

Id. § 12.

38

Id. § 13.

39
Robbins, supra n.5; see also Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in
Need of Reform, 76 Judicature 125 (1992).
40

Robbins, supra n.5, at 177-78.

41

Id. at 178.

7

Providing reciprocity, so that a court which may receive questions may also certify
questions; 42
Allowing certification of questions which “may be determinative” rather than requiring
that the question “must be determinative”; 43
Allowing certification of questions when “no controlling” precedent exists, rather than
the “no clear controlling” standard; 44
Allowing initiation of certification sua sponte or on motion; 45
Encouraging preferential treatment of certification cases, by requiring the responding
court to act “as soon as practicable . . .”; 46 and
Clarifying who generates the statement of facts in the certification order, by specifying
that the parties may propose facts, but that the court has final responsibility. 47
Comparing Robbins’ recommendations to the Uniform Act (1967) shows that only the last two
features in the above list were new. His intention was therefore principally to unify existing
versions of the Uniform Act (1967) by calling attention to the problems with the variants which
had been adopted. His recommendations were influential. 48
The Uniform Act (1967) was revised in 1995. Beyond Robbins article, a deep study by
the American Judicature Society was also influential in the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act (1995) (“Uniform Act (1995)”). A survey of “all federal judges on the U.S. district
courts and circuit courts of appeals and all state supreme court justices” 49 along with a
compilation of all rules and statutes governing certification was “presented to a group of U.S.
district and circuit judges and state supreme court justices who, in December 1994, attended a
National Workshop on Certification of Questions of Law . . . .” 50 The workshop resulted in
several recommendations:

42

Id. at 179.

43

Id. at 179-80.

44

Id. at 180.

45

Id. at 181.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (1995) (“Uniform Act (1995)”); 12 U.L.A. 71 (1995).

49

Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 1.

50

Id. at 2.

8

Whether a litigant was a plaintiff who initiated a federal case or a defendant who
removed a state case should have no bearing on the certification process; 51
State courts should establish standards and criteria for accepting questions, including the
Oregon standard “that the answer ‘would have the potential of resolving at least one
claim’ in the litigation”; 52
The priority of treatment and time limits of a certified case should be determined on a
case-by-case basis; 53
A certifying court should be free to communicate with an accepting court; 54
Reformulation of questions should be permitted; 55
Certifying courts should not have discretion to reject answers to certifying questions; 56
and
Answers to certified questions should be binding precedent. 57
The National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws released the 1995
revision in the fall of that year. According to Jonas Goldschmidt, the principal changes in the
Uniform Act (1995) are:
(1) the Act now allows for certification to and from tribal courts, and·Canadian and
Mexican courts, including the highest or intermediate appellate courts;
(2) it provides that certification is only appropriate where no controlling answer to the
question is provided by a constitutional provision, statute, or appellate decision;
(3) it provides that a certified question may be reformulated by the answering court;
(4) it requires that the certification be accompanied by an agreed statement of facts, or, if
one cannot be agreed upon, by a statement of facts determined by the court; and, most
notably,
(5) the Act now contains a provision stating that the receiving court “shall notify the
certifying court of acceptance or rejection of the question; and, in accordance with

51

Id. at 75.

52

Id. at 76.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id. at 77.

57

Id.

9

notions of comity and fairness, it shall respond to an accepted certified question as soon
as practicable.” 58
As a result of the discussion leading up to and the publication of the Uniform Act (1995)
and continued advocacy for certification, almost all states and the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, 59 the Northern Mariana Islands and Guam provide for certification. 60 North Carolina is the
only state without a certification procedure. 61

Debate on Value of Certification
Despite the rapid spread and current prevalence of certification procedures, debate about
the practice persisted. Proponents argued the superiority of certification over the former practice
of abstention, under which the court uncertain about the law of a state would stay or dismiss its
proceedings, and leave the parties to find the answer to state law from a court of that state.
Abstention left parties without resolution of their dispute in the court where the case was
originally filed and pushed them to a state trial court declaratory judgment proceeding that could
lead to an appeal. The delay and expense were not minimal.
Principles of comity are cited in favor of certification, 62 along with the wisdom of
deferring interpretation of state law to the highest court in a state. If state supreme courts are
regarded in practice as the final arbiter of state law issues, inconsistencies between state and
federal decisions are reduced. 63 One federal judge has referred to the relief from “guesswork”
that certification affords. 64 Certification can also be said to dampen forum shopping. A
prospective litigant has no incentive to seek an alternative federal interpretation of state law if
the federal court policy is that that a state law issue will be certified to a state court. And
certification has the benefit of bringing a discrete legal issue to the state supreme court before the

58

Id. at 102.

59
Eric Eisenberg, A Divine Comity: Certification (at Last) in North Carolina, 58 Duke L.J. 69, 71 (2008); Sharika
Robinson, Right, but for the Wrong Reasons: How A Certified Question to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
Could Have Alleviated Conflicting Views and Brought Clarity to North Carolina State Law, 34 N.C. Cent. L. Rev.
230 (2012).
60
Gregory L. Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third
Circuit's Experience,115 Penn St. L. Rev. 377, 384-85, and 385 n.59 (2010-2011).
61

“North Carolina is the only state in the Fourth Circuit without such a mechanism.” Stahle v. CTS Corp., 817 F.3d
96, 113 (4th Cir. 2016) (Thacker, Circuit Judge, concurring); “North Carolina is the sole state in the union that does
not permit a federal court to certify questions of state law to the high state court for resolution.” United States v.
Kelly, 917 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 (W.D.N.C. 2013).
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M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer Came There None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question
of State Law, 41 Wayne L. Rev. 273, 301 (1994-1995); Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An
Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. Miami L. Rev. 717, 724-25 (1968-1969).
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Schneider, supra n.62, at 299-301; Mattis, supra n.62, at 724.
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George v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 700, 715 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (quoting Renteria–Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville & Davidson Cty., 2011 WL 4048523, at *12 (M.D. Tenn. September 12, 2011).
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expense of trial is incurred. In this respect, filing a case in federal court has an advantage over
filing in state court.
But these benefits are not universally acknowledged to outweigh the time and expense
that certification proceedings cause. There is no question that certification takes time, while the
question is formulated, the order drafted and entered, and the state court process ensues. 65 A
1983 study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median delay is approximately six
months. 66 But if the legal question were not certified to the state court, it would have been
briefed, argued and decided in the federal court, possibly in that same time frame and with
similar expense.
Some have argued that federal judges are just as able to determine state law issues as
their state court colleagues, sometimes with more staff resources, and that there are benefits from
“cross-pollination” when two judicial systems look at legal questions. 67 Whether that outweighs
comity is a matter of opinion. But this comparison of relative competency, usually by a
competitive federal court, fails to recognize the value of decisions of state law made by the court
constitutionally entrusted with the duty to decide those issues. It fails, usually from an outside
perspective, to recognize the benefit of decisions by a court integrated into a system of state law,
by judges who have experience in that state’s legal system and better understand the policy and
values of the state.
In some instances, answers from a state supreme court have been ignored or rejected by
the certifying federal court, causing some to object that the state court is giving advisory
opinions. 68 In other instances, the federal case resolves while the certification issue is still
pending or without regard to the answer, because other decisive issues arise after certification.
Because certification can occur early in a federal case, the question can be regarded as
abstract. 69 Formulation of an issue too early can consume a great deal of time and may, as
discovery and motions develop, prove to be an inaccurate forecast. Piecemeal litigation is
generally disfavored. 70 The American common law system discourages interlocutory appeals, but
certification is just that—the federal court presents an issue to an appellate state court, before
trial has taken place.

65

Mattis, supra n.62, at 725-27 (1969).

66

Bassler, supra n.4, at 511; Schneider, supra n.62, at 296.

67

Bassler, supra n.4, at 516-20.

68

Id. at 520-25; John B. Corr and Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, Vand. L. Rev.
411, 419-20 (1988); Mattis, supra n.62, at 734.

69

Bassler, supra n.4, at 525; Schneider, supra n.62, at 294-95; Corr & Robbins, supra n.68, at 422.

70

Mattis, supra n.62, at 727-28.
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Early in the American certification experience, some expressed fear of overloading state
dockets. 71 But no jurisdiction reports this as a problem, 72 though some state courts reject a much
higher percentage of certified questions than other courts. 73
Some practitioners express that certification may misshape issues in a case. Some feel
that judges attempt to avoid federal constitutional issues by finding a state law issue that might
vitiate the constitutional claim. This could allow the federal judge to defer action, dodge a hard
issue, and defer truly deserved relief from constitutional violations.
But certification has strong advocates. The U.S. Supreme Court, as noted above, praised
the process in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Limited. And it has further said certification “does, of
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism.” 74
Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit penned a stirring opinion (in dissent) that
“federal courts in general, and this circuit in particular, have tended to be far too reluctant to
certify questions to the state courts.” 75 His fundamental premise was that “[r]eluctance to certify
is wrong because it leads to precisely the kind of forum shopping that Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins
was intended to prevent.” 76 The majority opinion in the case relied on authority from
intermediate New York courts which would “prevent the state’s highest court from reaching the
issue . . . .” 77 [I]n the absence of certification, the party that is favored by the lower court
decisions will almost invariably seek federal jurisdiction” 78 to avoid contrary binding state
precedent. And similar result would occur when an old state decision is contrary to emerging
authority in other states. 79 The party favored by the outdated case law will avoid state court.
Thus, he concluded “When federal courts, in effect, prevent state courts from deciding unsettled

71

Bassler, supra n.4, at 511, 514.

72

Schneider, supra n.62, at 297-98.

73

Id. at 315-17. The 27 certification orders over a 20-year period reported in the article would not seem to be a
burden. But the Michigan Supreme Court answered only eight.

74

Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).

75

McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge Calabresi cited Martin
Flumenbaum and Brad S. Karp, Certification of Unsettled Law Issues, N.Y.L.J., January 29, 1992, at 3 (“noting that
the procedure for certification to the New York Court of Appeals ‘has been used only sparingly by the Second
Circuit,’ which in 1992 had certified only five issues over the preceding six-year period.”).

76

McCarthy, 119 F.3d at 157 (citations omitted).

77

Id. at 158.

78

Id. at 157-58.

79

Id. at 158 n.1.
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issues of state law, they violate fundamental principles of federalism and comity.” 80 Those courts
“end up ‘mak[ing] important state policy, in contravention of basic federalism principles.’ ” 81
He rejected the argument that federal courts use certification to shift unwanted burdens to
state courts:
[I]t is well known that state court judges have expressed both publicly and
privately their desire for certification and their irritation with the fact that federal
courts often decide interesting and important questions rather than certifying them
to the courts that should be deciding them. More importantly, a state court that
feels overburdened, or that for any other reason does not wish to decide the
certified question, is always free to refuse to answer it. 82
Judge Calabresi gave the example of cases deciding ownership of stolen property in
which the statute of limitations was used as a defense to a claim for recovery. The issue of
reasonable diligence in attempting to recover the property was presented. The Second Circuit
“elected not to certify this question of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals” 83 and
found that reasonable diligence was necessary to recovery of property. Judge Calabresi recounts
what happened when that same issue later arose in another case in state court:
Three years later, the New York Court of Appeals was presented with precisely
the same issue [as the Second Circuit], and held that the statute of limitations does
not require a showing of reasonable diligence. See Solomon R. Guggenheim
Found. v. Lubell, 77 N.Y.2d 311, 567 N.Y.S.2d 623, 626-27, 569 N.E.2d 426,
429-30 (1991). The [New York] Court of Appeals remarked, somewhat acidly:
Although the [Second Circuit] acknowledged that the question posed by
the case was an open one, it declined to certify it to this Court, stating that
it did not think that it “[would] recur with sufficient frequency to warrant
use of the certification procedure.” Actually, the issue has recurred several
times in the three years since DeWeerth was decided, including the case
now before us. We have reexamined the relevant New York case law and
we conclude that the Second Circuit should not have imposed a duty of
reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen art work for purposes of the
Statute of Limitations. 84
After the state court opinion Guggenheim made New York law clear, the claimant in the wrongly
decided Second Circuit case attempted to re-open her claim. 85 But it was too late. So the stolen

80

Id. at 158.

81

Id. (quoting Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 70 F.3d 291, 302 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., dissenting)).

82

Id. at 160.

83

Id. at 159.

84

Id.

85

Id.
13

painting that should have been her painting was not hers because the Second Circuit failed to
certify a question of state law.
Judge Calabresi persuasively argues that state courts should make significant state law
decisions. The court considering certification still must consider whether the existing state cases
are sufficiently clear. But if there is a serious question of state law, the issue should be certified.

Development of Utah’s Certification Process
Just as the Uniform Act (1967) was being promulgated, a Utah case illustrated the
conundrum presented by Utah’s lack of a certification procedure. In Black v. United States.,
District Judge Sherman Christensen considered “whether in Utah a husband can maintain an
action for loss of consortium by reason of negligent injury of his wife by a third person.” 86 Judge
Christensen traced Utah law from territorial times and concluded that where “the state Supreme
Court has not had occasion to pass upon the particular question, it still is my duty to ascertain the
best I can from all available sources what the local law is and apply it.” 87 Not finding a clear
statement that a right to loss of consortium existed in Utah, Judge Christensen declined to
recognize the claims stated and struck them:
Unless and until the Utah State Legislature or the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah expressly charts the course, it would be presumptuous under the
circumstances for the federal court to initiate and foster such a new and, in my
judgment, retrogressive and confusing system for the state. 88
Judge Christensen was thus compelled to deny the plaintiff’s claim. If a certification process had
existed, the Utah Supreme Court could have authoritatively rejected—or possibly recognized—
the plaintiff’s claim.
On appeal after trial, different issues were raised which also depended upon state law—
and were also without precedent.
To determine the answer to each of these issues it is necessary to apply the
substantive law of Utah as found in the statutory and case law of that state.
Counsel for Philco and plaintiff each state that no precedent of any kind exists
under the Utah law that serves as a persuasive guideline. . . .
[W]e consider it unnecessary and certainly undesirable to advance a foreguess as
to how the Utah Supreme Court would decide the issues were they presented to
that high court. 89

86

263 F.Supp. 470, 471 (D. Utah 1967).

87

Id. at 472-73.

88

Id. at 480.

89

Black v. United States, 421 F.2d 255, 258 (10th Cir. 1970).
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If certification had existed in Utah, the Utah Supreme Court could have spoken on these
issues.

1975 Certification Rule
Utah adopted a Certification Rule on April 17, 1975 (“1975 Certification Rule”). 90 While
based in part on the Uniform Act (1967), it appears to be most closely modeled on Colorado Rule
of Appellate Procedure 21.1 (“Colorado Rule”).
The 1975 Certification Rule reads:
(a) Power to Answer. The Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by
the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the United States, or a
United States District Court, when requested by the certifying court, if there is involved
in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
(b) Method of Invoking. This rule may be invoked by an order of any of the courts
referred to in section (a) upon said court's own motion.
(c) Contents of Certification Order. A certification order shall set forth:
(1) The question of law to be answered; and
(2) A statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully
the nature of the controversy in which the questions arose.
(d) Preparation of Certification Order. The certification order shall be prepared by the
certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at the hearing, and forwarded to the
Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The Supreme
Court may require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the
certifying court to be filed under the certification order, if, in the opinion of the Supreme
Court, the record or portion thereof may be necessary in answering the questions.
(e) Costs of Certification. Fees and costs shall be the same as in civil appeals docketed
before the Supreme Court and shall be equally divided between the parties unless
otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification.
(f) Briefs and Arguments. Upon the agreement of the Supreme Court to answer the
questions certified to it, notice shall be given to all parties. The plaintiff in the trial court,
or the appealing party in the appellate court shall file his opening brief within thirty days
from the date of receipt of the notice, and the opposing parties shall file an answer brief
within thirty days from service upon him of copies of the opening brief. A reply brief may
be filed within twenty days of the service of the answer brief. Briefs shall be in the
manner and form of briefs as provided in this Court.
(g) Opinion. The written opinion of the Supreme Court stating the law governing the
questions certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the Supreme Court to the
Certifying court and to the parties.

90

Holden v. NL Indus., Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 429 (Utah 1981). Unfortunately, no records of the adoption of the 1975
Certification Rule could be located at the Utah Supreme Court or in the Utah State Law Library.
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Comparison with Colorado Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.1
The only variations between the Colorado Rule and the 1975 Certification Rule are:
a.
b.

c.

elimination by Utah of the United States Court of Claims as a potentially
certifying court;
elimination by Utah of the possible initiation of certification by motion of the
parties, even though that feature was included in the Uniform Act (1967). (The
1975 Certification Rule only permitted sua sponte certification.); and
minor technical changes, such as changes in briefing times, and reference to Utah
rules regarding argument rather than referring to the Colorado argument rule. 91

Comparison with Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (1967)
The 1975 Certification Rule 92 varies in more significant ways from the Uniform Act
(1967). The 1975 Certification Rule:
a.

b.
c.
d.
e.

omits references 93 to many potential certifying courts: “the United States Court of
International Trade, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United
States Claims Court, the United States Court of Military Appeals, the United
States Tax Court, [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate
court of any other state] . . . .”;
requires the certification order to set forth the “question of law to be answered”
rather than referring to “questions of law”; 94
has a more complete description of the briefing process; 95
omits the procedures and the power to certify to the courts of other states; 96 and
omits provisions on severability, 97 construction, 98 short title 99 and effective
date. 100

91

The 1975 Certification Rule has other minor puzzling variations from the Colorado Rule, such as subtitle (f)’s
reference to “Arguments” rather than “argument,” though that subsection in both rules and in the Uniform Act
(1967) has no text about oral argument, and capitalization of “Certifying” when referring to the originating court
in (g)—but not in other parts of the rule.

92

The 1975 Certification Rule and the Colorado Rule have the same variations from the Uniform Act (1967).

93

Compare 1975 Certification Rule at (a) with Uniform Act (1967) § 1.

94

Compare 1975 Certification Rule at (c)(1) with Uniform Act (1967) § 3(1).

95

1975 Certification Rule at (f).
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Uniform Act (1967) §§ 8-9.

97

Id. § 10.
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Id. § 11.
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Id. § 12.
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Id. § 13.
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Holden v. NL Industries Invalidates the 1975 Certification Rule
In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court struck down the 1975 Certification Rule as
unconstitutional in Holden v. NL Industries. 101 After an adverse ruling from the trial court,
plaintiff’s counsel asked for and was granted certification of two questions. The Supreme Court’s
acceptance was expressly tentative, because the “defendant . . . filed a motion in opposition to
acceptance of certification.” 102 After briefly recounting the status of certification procedures
nationally and reciting the 1975 Certification Rule, Justice Dallin Oaks searched for a
jurisdictional basis on which the Utah Supreme Court might accept questions certified from
federal courts. First, he looked to the Utah Constitution Judicial Article: 103
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. Each of the justices shall
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, to any part of the State, upon petition
by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and may make such writs
returnable before himself or the Supreme Court or before any district court or
judge thereof in the State. In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of
that jurisdiction.
He concluded “This section grants no ‘original jurisdiction’ to answer certified questions since
certification does not involve one of the writs to which this Court’s original jurisdiction is
limited.” 104 A comparison with Colorado’s Constitution was important to his decision. The
Colorado Constitution granted jurisdiction to the Colorado Supreme Court “to issue writs . . . and
such other original and remedial writs as may be provided by rule of court with authority to hear
and determine the same.” 105 Citation of the Colorado Constitution made sense because Utah’s
1975 Certification Rule appears to have been derived from the Colorado rule.
Justice Oaks then looked to the constitutional reference to appellate jurisdiction as
providing authority to answer certified questions. This possibility was rejected because of one
word:
Article VIII, Section 4 . . . provides: “In other cases the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction only . . . .” The comparable provision in most state
constitutions omits the word only. In the absence of that negative, the
constitutional conferral of appellate jurisdiction would be susceptible to the
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629 P.2d 428; see also Bassler, supra n.4, at 934; Goldschmidt, supra n.1, at 95.

102

Holden, 629 P.2d at 429.

103

Utah Const. art. VII, § 4.

104

Holden, 629 P.2d at 430.

105

Id. (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3).
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construction that the court's jurisdiction could be enlarged by an exercise of
legislative or judicial power, by law or by court rule. 106
He compared the Utah result with a decision of the Washington Supreme Court, 107 under a
constitution omitting the word “only” and generously providing ‘“appellate jurisdiction in all
actions and proceedings . . . .” 108 “Since this provision contained no limitation similar to that in
the Utah Constitution, the Washington Legislature was free to define its court’s jurisdiction to
include the functions specified in the [Washington] certification legislation.” 109 And he also
contrasted the favorable findings of constitutionality in Florida and Alabama. 110
Finally, Justice Oaks examined whether “appellate jurisdiction only” might include
responding to questions from a federal trial court. He found that it did not, because appellate
jurisdiction applies to inferior courts, not to courts of other jurisdictions.
“Appellate jurisdiction” obviously connotes review of the action of an inferior
court. “Inferior court” has been appropriately defined as “any court subordinate to
the chief appellate tribunal in the particular judicial system.” Federal courts are
not “inferior courts” to this Court. Consequently, this Court's answer to a certified
question in a case that originated in or is to be adjudicated in a federal court is not
an exercise of “appellate jurisdiction” within the meaning of the Utah
Constitution. 111
So the Utah Supreme Court withdrew its own 1975 Certification Rule as unconstitutional
and dismissed Holden’s request for certification, but with a salute to the idea of certification:
The procedure devised to permit federal courts to certify questions of state law for
state courts to answer is a commendable effort to further the interest of justice
through cooperative efforts by state and federal courts. If our constitutional
powers permitted us to be involved in that kind of cooperative effort, and if other
legal questions unnecessary to the disposition of this case could be resolved, we
would have no hesitancy. But under the current language of our constitution, we
must conclude that this Court has no jurisdiction to provide federal courts the
requested ruling on state law. 112
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Id.
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In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
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Holden, 629 P.2d at 430.
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Id.
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Id. at 431 (citing Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 133 So.2d at 742) (construing Fla. Const. art. V, §§ 3-4; Ala. Const. art. VI,
§ 140 (Amend. No. 328)).
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Holden, 629 P.2d at 431.
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Id. at 431-32.
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How could a court unanimously strike down a rule it adopted only six years earlier? The
composition of the Utah Supreme Court changed completely between 1975 and 1981. 113 None of
the justices present in 1975 were still present in 1981. The members of the Holden court were not
personally committed to the 1975 Certification Rule.
Utah’s constitutional quandary is notable because Holden is the only case to find a
certification procedure unconstitutional. 114 While Arkansas’s Constitution had similar
restrictions, 115 the Arkansas Constitution was amended 116 in 2000 to grant “[o]riginal jurisdiction
to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States, which may be exercised
pursuant to Supreme Court rule.” 117 Thus, Utah stands alone as adopting a certification
procedure, invalidating it, and—after a constitutional amendment—readopting certification.

1984 Judicial Article of Utah Constitution
The Utah Constitution judicial article was amended in 1984 and one part of the
amendment permitted certification. 118 But the amendment was not caused by Holden. The
revision of Article VIII was precipitated by a dispute between the courts and legislature over
judicial nomination and appointment processes. The result was “a complete rewrite of the
judicial article of the Utah Constitution that finally settled [that] dispute and several other longstanding issues with a set of wide-ranging compromises that brought all interested parties to the
table.” 119
The new version of Article VIII, Section 3 expressly confers jurisdiction to answer
questions from federal courts:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs
and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The
Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be
exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and orders necessary
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the complete determination
of any cause.

113

In 1975, Justices J. Allen Crockett, F. Henri Henriod, E. R. Callister, R. L. Tuckett, and A. H. Ellett were on the
Utah Supreme Court. In 1981, the Utah Supreme Court consisted of Richard J. Maughan, Gordon R. Hall, I. Daniel
Stewart, Richard C. Howe, and Dallin H. Oaks.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Justices_of_the_Utah_Supreme_Court (last visited January 12, 2018).
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The Utah Supreme Court is now empowered “to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States.” 120 Thus “[a]ny court of the United States” 121 may certify a question
to the Utah Supreme Court, but other state courts may not. And the Utah Court of Appeals may
not receive certified questions. 122

Effectuating the Constitutional Revision
Utah Code Provision
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102, which defines Utah Supreme Court jurisdiction, states in
subsection (1) that “The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law
certified by a court of the United States.” This is a verbatim mirror of the Utah Constitution
provision, which fortunately prevents any separation of powers issue arising from a conflict
between the constitutional powers of the court and the legislative enactment. 123
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41
Following approval of the 1984 Constitutional Amendment, Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41 was adopted. 124 Rule 41provides:
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW BY UNITED STATES
COURTS
(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The Utah Supreme Court may
answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when
requested to do so by such certifying court acting in accordance with the
provisions of this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding
before the certifying court is uncertain.
(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United States may invoke this rule by
entering an order of certification as described in this rule. When invoking this
rule, the certifying court may act either sua sponte or upon a motion by any party.
(c) Certification order.
(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the Utah Supreme Court
and shall state:

120

Utah Const. art. VIII, § 3.

121

Utah R. App. P. 41(b).

122

The amendment also expanded writ power to “all extraordinary writs” from “writs of mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus.” Utah Const. art. VII, § 3. Notably, legislative control was limited to
appellate jurisdiction.

123

In re Young, 976 P.2d 581.
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Unfortunately, no records of adoption of Utah R. App. 41 could be located in the Utah Supreme Court or Utah
State Law Library. The year of adoption is not clear. It was likely adopted in 1986 after the massive revision of the
Utah Judicial Code was enacted, following the 1984 Constitutional Revision. H.B. 100, Judicial Article
Implementation, Utah Session Laws 1986 Ch. 47, was passed February 26, 1986. That was the first statutory
recognition of the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court “to answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States.” Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2 (1986).
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(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered;
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in
a proceeding pending before the certifying court; and
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law.
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which are relevant to the
determination of the question certified and which show the nature of the
controversy, the context in which the question arose, and the procedural
steps by which the question was framed.
(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the order any additional
reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not otherwise
apparent.
(d) Form of certification order; submission of record. A certification order shall be
signed by the judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to the certification
order and forwarded to the Utah Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying
court under its official seal. The Supreme Court may require that all or any
portion of the record before the certifying court be filed with the Supreme Court if
the record or a portion thereof may be necessary in determining whether to accept
the certified question or in answering that question. A copy of the record certified
by the clerk of the certifying court to conform to the original may be substituted
for the original as the record.
(e) Acceptance or rejection of certification. Upon filing of the certification order
and accompanying papers with the clerk, the Supreme Court shall promptly enter
an order either accepting or rejecting the question certified to it, and the clerk
shall serve copies of the order upon the certifying court and all parties identified
in the certification order. If the Supreme Court accepts the question, the Court will
set out in the order of acceptance (1) the specific question or questions accepted,
(2) the deadline for notifying the Supreme Court as to those portions of the record
which shall be copied and filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and (3)
information as to when the briefing schedule will be established.
(f) Briefing; oral argument. The form of briefs and proceedings on oral argument
will be governed by these rules except as such rules may be modified by the
Supreme Court to accommodate the differences between the appeal process and
the determination of a certified question. The clerk of the Supreme Court will
provide written notice to the parties as to the schedule for the filing of briefs and
content requirements, as well as the schedule and procedures for oral argument.
(g) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. Upon acceptance by the Supreme Court
of the question of law presented by the certification order, counsel for the parties
not licensed to practice law in the state of Utah may appear pro hac vice upon
motion filed pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration.
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The procedure of Utah R. App. P. 41 differs from the 1975 Certification Rule in many
respects. The new rule:
allows certification by any “court of the United States,” 125 rather than enumerating
potential certifying federal courts; 126
refers to a certified “question of law,” 127 rather than “questions of law”; 128
permits certification when “the law of Utah is . . . uncertain,” 129 and that “there appears to
be no controlling Utah law,” 130 rather than referring to certification when “there is no
controlling precedent”; 131
requires that the question be a controlling issue of law, and that the order state the
same, 132 while the 1975 Certification Rule permitted certification of a question “which
may be determinative”; 133
permits certification orders “upon a motion by a party,” in addition to the sua sponte
certification permitted in the 1975 Certification Rule; 134
requires that the certification order include all facts “which are relevant to the
determination of the question certified,” 135 rather than those relevant to the “questions
certified”; 136
requires the certification order to specify “the context in which the questions arose, and
the procedural steps by which the question was framed”; 137
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Utah R. App. P. 41(a).

126

1975 Certification Rule at (a).

127

Utah R. App. P. 41(a), (c)(1).
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1975 Certification Rule at (a).
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Utah R. App. P. 41(a).

130

Id. at 41(c)(1)(C).
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1975 Certification Rule at (a).
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Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B).

133

1975 Certification Rule at (a).
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Utah R. App. P. 41(b), compare with 1975 Certification Rule at (b).

135

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).

136

1975 Certification Rule at (c)(1)(2).

137

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).
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permits the certification order to include “any additional reasons for . . . entry of the
certification order that are not otherwise apparent”; 138
refers to the Supreme Court’s determination “whether to accept the certified question,” 139
and has a new subsection (e) regarding the acceptance process and an order of acceptance
(which was not treated in the 1975 Certification Rule, and which implies questions may
be rejected);
has a new provision regarding pro hac vice admission of counsel; 140
permits flexibility in briefing and argument, providing that the normal rules and
timeframes “may be modified by the Supreme Court to accommodate the differences
between the appeal process and determination of a certified question”; 141 and
has technical refinements, such as including the state name in places as a descriptor of the
“Utah” Supreme Court, 142 referring generally to other rules of the court regarding
briefing and oral argument (and actually mentioning oral argument), and providing for
certification of a copy of the certifying court’s record. 143
Comparison with Uniform Act (1995)
Utah Rule 41 varies from the Uniform Act (1995) 144 in several respects, which is to be
expected as Rule 41 preceded the Uniform Act (1995) by a decade:
The Utah Rule does not permit the Utah Supreme Court (or the Utah Court of Appeals) to
certify a question to another court; 145
The Utah Rule does not permit courts of states, tribes, or Mexican courts to certify
questions; 146

138

Id. at 41(c)(2).

139

Id. at 41(d).

140

Id. at 41(g).

141

Id. at 41(f).

142

Id. at 41(a), (c)(1), (d).

143

Id. at 41(c)(2).

144

While the Uniform Act (1995) was promulgated nearly a decade after Utah R. App. 41, it is the most recent
uniform law on the subject of certification, so it is the most universal standard for comparison of Utah and national
practice.

145

Uniform Act (1995) § 2.

146

Id. § 3.
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The Uniform Act (1995) allows certifying to obtain an answer that “may be determinative
of an issue,” 147 while the Utah Rule requires a certified issue to be “controlling” 148 which
may mean it must control the federal litigation, not merely an issue in it; 149
While the Utah Rule requires that there be “no controlling Utah Law” 150 and that “the
state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding before the certifying court [be]
uncertain” 151on the certified issue, the Uniform Act (1995) specifies sources of law which
might be regarded as controlling—“no controlling appellate decision, constitutional
provision, or statute of this State”; 152
Rule 41 specifies that certification may be raised in the federal court “either sua sponte or
upon a motion by any party”; 153
The Uniform Act (1995) expressly permits the receiving court to “reformulate a question
of law certified to it” 154 and also requires the certification order to expressly state that the
receiving court may reformulate the question, 155 while the Utah Rule has no such
provision; 156
The Uniform Act (1995) requires the certification order to contain “the names and
addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without counsel”; 157
The Uniform Act (1995) contemplates that parties will have an opportunity to “agree
upon a statement of facts” 158 in the certification order;

147

Id. § 3.

148

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B).

149

Some jurisdictions adopt the Uniform Act (1995) with a requirement that the issue be determinative of the
“cause” or their courts interpret their enactment in that manner. See Eric C. Surette, Construction and Application of
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, 69 A.L.R. 6th 415, §§ 27-28 (2011).

150

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(C).

151

Id. at 41(a).

152

Uniform Act (1995) § 3.

153

Utah R. App. P. 41(b).

154

Uniform Act (1995) § 4.

155

Id. § 6(a)(3).

156

The Utah Supreme Court has determined it has this authority. In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d 168 (Utah
2000).

157

Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4).

158

Id. § 6(b).
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Rule 41 requires a certification order to set forth “the procedural steps by which the
question was framed”; 159
The Uniform Act (1995) requires that the accepting court “in accordance with notions of
comity and fairness, respond to an accepted certified question as soon as practicable”; 160
Rule 41 allows the Supreme Court to specify a briefing schedule, 161 and applies standard
appellate rules to briefs and argument, unless “modified by the Supreme Court to
accommodate the differences between the appeal process and the determination of a
certified question, 162 while the Uniform Act (1995) suggests application of “the rules and
statutes governing briefs, arguments, and other appellate procedures”; 163
The Uniform Act (1995) specifies that the responding court “shall state in a written
opinion the law answering the certified question and send a copy of the opinion to the
certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel”; 164
The Uniform Act (1995) specifies that “[f]ees and costs are the same as in [civil appeals]
docketed before the [Supreme Court] of this State and must be equally divided between
the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court”; 165
Rule 41 provides for appearance of counsel pro hac vice in certification proceedings,
which is apparently not permitted in other proceedings before the Utah Supreme Court; 166
and
The Uniform Act (1995) has technical sections on severability, 167 construction, 168 and
citation title. 169
Both Rule 41 and the Uniform Act (1995) require the certification order to state the
question of law to be answered, 170 facts relevant to the controversy and the nature of the

159

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).

160

Uniform Act (1995) § 7.

161

Utah R. App. P. 41(e)(3).

162

Id. at 41(f).

163

Uniform Act (1995) § 8.

164

Id. § 9.

165

Id. § 10.

166

Utah R. App. P. 41(g).

167

Uniform Act (1995) § 12.

168

Id.

169

Id. § 13.

170

Id. § 6(a)(1); Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(A).
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controversy, 171 and contain requirements for delivery of the certification order and record to the
receiving court. 172
Comparison with Utah’s Interlocutory Appeal Rule
The Utah Rule can also be compared to Utah’s rule on interlocutory appeals from lower
courts. 173 Certification comes before a federal court adjudication, while interlocutory appeals are
taken from an entered order in litigation underway in an inferior court. In interlocutory appeals,
the lower court assures the Utah appellate court that enough record exists to adjudicate the
question. A certified question is more hypothetical and posed in advance of a decision.
Receipt of certified questions and interlocutory appeals is discretionary with the appellate
court. The appellate court controls its review of these matters, and can exercise unrestrained
discretion in accepting or rejecting them.
Both processes require the receiving appellate court consider similar issues:
Interlocutory Appeals
The issue presented 174

Certification of Questions
The question of law to be answered 176

A concise analysis of the statutes, rules
or cases believed to be determinative
of the issue stated 175
A concise statement of facts material to All facts which are relevant to the
a consideration of the issue presented
determination of the question
and the order sought to be reviewed 177 certified 178
The terms and circumstances of the
case but without unnecessary detail 179

171

Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(2); Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).

172

Uniform Act (1995) § 5; Utah R. App. P. 41(d).

173

Utah R. App. P. 5.

174

Id. at 5(c)(1)(B).

175

Id. at 5(c)(1)(C).

176

Id. at 41(c)(1)(A).

177

The nature of the controversy, the
context in which the question arose,

Id. at 5(c)(1)(A).

178

Id. at 41(c)(2).

179

Id. at 5(c)(1)(B).
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Interlocutory Appeals

Certification of Questions
and the procedural steps by which the
question was framed 180

A statement of the reasons why an
immediate interlocutory appeal should
be permitted 181

That the question certified is a
controlling issue of law in a
proceeding pending before the
certifying court 183

The reason why the appeal may
materially advance the termination of
the litigation 182
Each process requires consideration of unique factors. A party petitioning for
interlocutory appeal must demonstrate “that the issue was preserved in the trial court,” 184 and
“state the applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting authority.” 185 Those factors
have no corollary in certification. The federal court certifies that the question relates to a “live”
issue, to which the answer is required to make a dispositive decision. And the federal court has
not made a substantive decision, so no standard of review applies. But the Utah Supreme Court
has full discretion with regard to the certifying order—the question(s) may be accepted,
reformulated, or rejected.
Certification requires that “[t]he state of the law of Utah applicable to a proceeding
before the certifying court is uncertain” 186 and “there appears to be no controlling Utah law.” 187
Because a question presented on interlocutory appeal is often mixed law and fact, that process
does not require isolation of a unique, undecided legal issue.
Initiation of the interlocutory and certification processes is different because of the
method in which they arise. Utah certification may be initiated by the federal court sua sponte 188
and is then ordered by the court, 189 but interlocutory appeals require a party petition. 190 Because

180

Id. at 41(c)(2).

181

Id. at 5(c)(1)(C).

182

Id. at 5(c)(1)(D).

183

Id. at 41(c)(1)(B).

184

Id.

185

Id. at 5(c)(1)(B).

186

Id. at 41(a).

187

Id. at 41(c)(1)(C).

188

Id. at 41(b).

189

Id. at 41(a).

190

Id. at 5(a).
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of its decision-making responsibility, the federal court controls the certification process, while
parties have the burden of going forward in interlocutory appeals.
Comparing factors relevant in interlocutory appeal and certification informs some
recommendations for procedural improvements at the end of this thesis.

Cases Bridging the Certification Processes
Stubbs v. United States 191 bridged the time between the 1975 Certification Rule and the
certification procedure enabled by the 1984 constitutional revision. Stubbs’ first appeal, taken in
1979, was from Stubbs’ suit against the federal government to quiet title and partition property.
The case was largely decided on federal law.
The second appeal involving Stubbs, decided in 1985, was from a separate case the
government was compelled to file against Stubbs because he “apparently persisted in asserting
rights to the property . . . .” 192 This appeal presented many state law issues. As to one, the circuit
court stated “[t]he United States has suggested that we might certify this question [about effect of
a deed] to the Supreme Court of Utah for its definitive answer.” 193 But the Tenth Circuit declined
to certify because the issue was subordinate to another decisive issue, on which the law and facts
were clear. “We do not do so because we are satisfied that even if we have erroneously
interpreted Utah law on this issue, the stipulated facts sufficiently establish that the United States
had acquired good title by adverse possession by 1955.” 194 Apparently, the Tenth Circuit felt that
the passage of the constitutional revision in 1984 was sufficient to enable certification even
though the statute and rule had not yet been enacted.
Worthen v. Kennecott Corp. 195 originated before certification was available and ended
after it was available. District Judge David Winder received a motion for certification 196 but
“[t]he trial court denied such a motion because, at the time of trial, no such procedure was
available under Utah law.” 197 Judge Winder was the trial judge in Holden v. NL Industries. 198
Undeterred, “Appellant . . . urged [the Tenth Circuit] to certify the question concerning the dual
capacity doctrine to the Utah Supreme Court.” 199 Apparently, this request was made at argument.
Examining Utah law, Circuit Judge McKay (who is from Utah) wrote that “[t]he combination of

191

620 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980).

192

United States v. Stubbs, 776 F.2d 1472, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985).

193

Id. at 1475.

194

Id.

195

780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).

196

The motion is not listed on the case docket, but it may have been embedded in the summary judgment motion
papers filed in 1984 and 1985, or in the motion to amend or alter the decision filed in February 1985.

197

Worthen, 780 F.2d at 860.

198

629 P.2d 428.

199

Worthen, 780 F.2d at 860.
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the clarity of the issue and the amount of time which has transpired since this matter was first
raised leads us to conclude that this is not a case appropriate for the necessarily duplicative
efforts of referring the case to the Utah Supreme Court.” 200 Judge McKay clarified that he was
not generally disposed against certification but that timeliness was a significant consideration.
“We do not mean thereby to imply that we are hostile to suggestions of certification of state law
to the appropriate state courts. Ordinarily, such suggestions are best raised on appeal by motion
before the case has been fully submitted and argued.” 201

Early Certification Cases Under the New Rule
According to currently available records, District Judge Bruce Jenkins was the first
federal judge to certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court under Rule 41, adopted after the
constitutional revision. In late 1989, he certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court. The
Court accepted the question but the parties settled the case in late 1991, before an answer was
received.
The first full use of the new certification process was in 1990-91 in Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co. District Judge Thomas Greene at the federal court faced a case 202 with multiple causes of
action arising out of a daughter’s shooting of her mother while the daughter was under the
influence of Halcion. One cause of action alleged strict liability, and Judge Greene certified the
question “whether Utah adopts the ‘unavoidably unsafe products’ exception to strict products
liability as set forth in comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)
(“comment k”).” His certification order was issued December 19, 1990; the Utah Supreme Court
accepted the question January 8, 1991; and the opinion issued only four months later on May 14,
1991. 203 The pace is even more remarkable as the decision was 3-2, with two separate dissenting
opinions. 204 The majority “characterize[ed] all FDA-approved prescription medications as
‘unavoidably unsafe,’” thus “expanding the literal interpretation of comment k.” 205 Following
the Utah Supreme Court’s decision, the parties briefed its impact on the case, and settled it in
August 1991. 206
Over a year before he certified the question in Grundberg, Judge Greene received a
motion to certify in Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc. 207 His order certifying the question did not

200

Id.

201

Id.

202
Grundberg, 2:89-cv-00274-JTG. When referring to cases in the District of Utah, the local case citation will be
used and where possible, will be linked to the case docket.
203

Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).

204

Id. at 99-100.

205

Id. at 90.

206

Order Dismissing Case, Grundberg, 2:89-cv-00274-JTG, docket no. 695, filed August 12, 1991.

207

Motion to Amend Judgment or in the Alternative for Certification, Hansen, 2:88-cv-00708-JTG, docket no. 95,
filed December 29, 1989.
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issue for nearly a year, 208 just six weeks before his certification order in Grundberg. The opinion
from the Supreme Court did not come for another 16 months. 209 The majority opinion was
shorter than Grundberg’s and the two concurrences were less than three lines. But Hansen took
two and a half years in the certification process, compared to Grundberg where the process only
took five months. Hansen did answer three questions, but stayed inside the parameters of the
Restatement and prior Utah precedent.
Grundberg and Hansen are contrasts in speed and complexity. Oddly, speed was
inversely proportional to the complexity of the Utah Supreme Court opinion. These early cases
illustrate that delay may – or may not—result from certification and that the delay cannot be
predicted accurately by complexity of issues or by the identity of the presiding federal judge.

Statistical Overview
Before examining groups of cases, a statistical overview provides perspective. As far as
could be determined, as of February 28, 2018, 134 Tenth Circuit, Utah federal district court and
Utah bankruptcy court cases have considered certification or—in cases before 1971 210—the need
for it. Of those cases, 211 about half did not certify a question to the Utah Supreme Court. And
about half of the cases did certify a question. In one case, 212 the district judge is currently
considering a motion to certify.

Certification by the Tenth Circuit - Summary Statistics
In 13 of the cases that did certify a question, the certification occurred in the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 213 rather than in the district or bankruptcy court. The district judges
from whom those appeals were taken are:

208

Order of Certification, Hansen, 2:88-cv-00708-JTG, docket no. 150, filed November 2, 1990.

209

Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992).

210

Black v. United States, C138-66 (D. Utah).

211

The thesis does not consider cases certified to the Utah Supreme Court from courts other than the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Nor does it consider cases in those courts which considered certification of questions to the courts of states other
than Utah.

212

Roberts v. CR England, 2:12-cv-00302-RJS-BCW.

213

United States v. Badger, 818 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 2016); Hogan v. UTOPIA, 635 Fed. App’x 509 (10th Cir. 2015);
Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp., 567 Fed. App’x 621 (10th Cir. 2014) (2:12-cv-00997-TS in the district court); Krehbiel
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 387 Fed. App’x 827 (10th Cir. 2010); Century Indem. v. Hanover Ins., 417 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir.
2005); Morgan v. McCotter, 365 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2004); Boyd v. Jones, 85 Fed. App’x 77 (10th Cir. 2003) (denied
because a recent Utah Supreme Court opinion addressed the issue, resulting in reversal of the trial court decision);
Johnson v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 216 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Danny's Constr. Co., Inc., 210 F.3d
389 (10th Cir. 2000); Bragg v. Buck, 1997 WL 474520 (10th Cir. 1997) (case reversed on a different issue, making
certification unnecessary); Adams v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Canada, 133 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1997); Lyman v. San
Juan Cty., 588 Fed. App’x 764 (10th Cir. 1994) (certification was sought on appeal by a different party, of a different
issue than was sought in a motion to certify in the district court); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., 990
F.2d 1175, 1178 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating “We remain convinced that the Utah Supreme Court would construe the
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Trial court judge
District Judge Dee Benson
District Judge Paul Cassell
District Judge Thomas Greene
District Judge Bruce Jenkins
District Judge Dale Kimball
District Judge Ted Stewart
District Judge Clark Waddoups
TOTAL

Certified
by Circuit
3
1
1
2
3
1
2
13

years on
bench 214
26
5½
25
31
20
18
9

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also considered motions for certification to the
Utah Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit:
•
•

has never (18 instances) certified a question to the Utah Supreme Court on motion of
a party made for the first time on appeal; 215 and
has never (7 instances) reversed a district court judge’s decision not to certify a
question to the Utah Supreme Court. 216

The Tenth Circuit practice demonstrates the importance of timely motions for certification in the
district court and that there is no second chance at the appellate court. The substantial number of
sua sponte certifications suggests that certification is not raised often enough in the district court.
In nine of the cases in which questions were certified sua sponte, the answer resulted in reversal

pollution exclusion as we did in Hartford [Accident & Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir.
1992)].”); Wright v. Deland, 986 F.2d 1432 (10th Cir 1993); Littlefield v. Mobil Expl. & Producing, N. Am., Inc., 131
F.3d 152 (10th Cir. 1992); Harline v. Gladwell, 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991); Jorgensen v. Larsen, 930 F.2d 922
(10th Cir. 1991); Worthen, 780 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1985).
214

Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available.

215

Garza v. Burnett, 547 Fed. App’x 908 (10th Cir. 2013); Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Horne, 698 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Reinhart, 505 Fed. App’x 761 (10th Cir. 2012); In re Reinhart,
477 Fed. App’x 510 (10th Cir. 2012); Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Justice Servs., 468 Fed. App’x 871 (10th Cir.
2012); McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 467 Fed. App’x 792 (10th Cir. 2012); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co v. Unigard
Ins. Co., 458 Fed. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2012); Mecham v. Frazier, 295 Fed. App’x 267 (10th Cir. 2008); Tabor v.
Metal Ware Corp., 251 Fed. App’x 577 (10th Cir. 2007); Olseth v. Larson, 236 Fed. App’x 443 (10th Cir. 2007);
Robert J. DeBry & Assocs., P.C. v. Quest Dex, Inc., 190 Fed. App'x 685 (10th Cir. 2006); Richardson v. Navistar
Int’l Transp. Corp., 231 F.3d 740 (10th Cir. 2000); Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc., 141 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 1998).
216

Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. AMSCO Windows, 593 Fed App’x 802 (10th Cir. 2014); Haik, 567 Fed. App’x 621 (this
case was 2:13-cv-01051-TS in the district court); Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills, 378 Fed. Appx. 859 (10th Cir.
2010); Soc’y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2005); Snyder v. Cache Cty., 18 Fed. App’x 693 (10th
Cir. 2001); Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 1998). In one other case, the district court did
not resolve a certification motion before the appeal, and the Tenth Circuit denied the motion to certify. Anderson v.
Toomey, 324 Fed. App’x 711 (10th Cir. 2009).
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of the district court’s opinion. 217 But in four instances, the Supreme Court’s answer did not
change the ruling below. 218 The Tenth Circuit’s track record for judging the need to certify is
impressive—in two thirds of the cases it certifies, the answer results in a reversal of the district
court. The Tenth Circuit certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court most frequently in in
2005-07 (three certification orders) and 2009-12 (seven certification orders).

Certification in the District and Bankruptcy Courts - Summary Statistics
When certification is sought by motion in the trial court, the rate of success is about 30%.
The rate of success varies widely by judge. District Judge Dee Benson has granted the most
motions for certification.
Trial court judge
District Judge Aldon Anderson
District Judge Dee Benson
District Judge Tena Campbell
District Judge Paul Cassell
District Judge Thomas Greene
District Judge Bruce Jenkins
District Judge Dale Kimball
District Judge David Nuffer
District Judge Jill Parrish
District Judge David Sam
District Judge Robert Shelby 220
District Judge Ted Stewart
District Judge Clark Waddoups
District Judge David Winder 221
Magistrate Judge Paul Warner
Magistrate Judge Evelyn Furse
Bankr. Judge Judith Boulden
TOTAL

motions
2
9
10
1
9
9
11
2
1
3
2
4
4
2
1
1
1
72

granted
1
6
1
1
5
1
3
0
0
1
0
0
1
2
0
1
1
24

per cent
granted
50%
66%
10%
100%
56%
11%
27%
0%
0%
33%
0%
0%
25%
100%
0%
100%
100%
33%

years on
bench 219
10
26
22
5½
25
31
20
14
2½
31
5
18
9
23
11
5½
24
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Garza, 547 Fed. App’x 908; Horne, 698 F.3d 1295; In re Reinhart, 505 Fed. App’x 761; Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 458
Fed. App’x 705; Mecham, 295 Fed. App’x 267; Tabor, 251 Fed. App’x 577; Olseth, 236 Fed. App’x 443;
Richardson, 231 F.3d 740; Hirpa, 141 F.3d 1184.
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In re Reinhart, 477 Fed. App’x 510; Whitney, 468 Fed. App’x 871; McArthur, 467 Fed. App’x 792; Robert J.
DeBry & Assocs., P.C., 190 Fed. App’x 685.
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Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available.
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One motion is pending decision. Roberts, 2:12-cv-00302-RJS-BCW.

221

One case in which Judge Winder granted certification was Holden v. NL Industries, 629 P.2d 428, which resulted
in overturning the 1975 Certification Rule.
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As might be expected, when the judge is the one who thinks of certification, certification
is far more likely to happen. But certification is not guaranteed, even then. Trial court judges
have sua sponte raised certification five times and later decided not to certify.
Trial court judge
District Judge Dee Benson
District Judge Tena Campbell
District Judge Paul Cassell
District Judge Thomas Greene
District Judge Bruce Jenkins
District Judge Dale Kimball
District Judge David Nuffer
District Judge Jill Parrish
District Judge David Sam
District Judge Robert Shelby
District Judge Ted Stewart
District Judge Clark Waddoups
District Judges Waddoups/Shelby/Nuffer
Magistrate Judge Brook Wells
Magistrate Judge Evelyn Furse
Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Anderson
Bankr. Judges Glen Clark / Bill Thurman
Bankruptcy Judge Kimball Mosier
TOTAL

raised sua certification
sponte
occurred
5
4
5
5
2
2
1
1
3
2
0
0
1
1
8
7
1
0
1
1
2
2
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
36
32

per cent years on
certified bench 222
80%
26
100%
22
100%
5½
100%
25
67%
31
0%
20
100%
14
75%
2½
0%
31
100%
5
100%
18
0%
9
100%
100%
14
100%
5½
100%
2
100%
100%
9
88%

Trial court judges have made 50% more certifications sua sponte than on motion. On the
average, on motion or sua sponte about 2 cases per year in the trial court have certified questions
since 1986. But in 2016 and 2017, 11 cases have certified questions.
Sua sponte certification seems to arise at a hearing on a dispositive motion, when the
judge recognizes that a controlling issue is an issue of state law. Motions to certify which are
granted also arise in the context of dispositive motions. The motions to certify are more often
granted if made in the briefing, with an admission that existing case law is unclear. But the
motions are denied if made at the hearing on the motion; after the movant has stated the law is
clear in briefing; or after the trial court judge has ruled or indicated an inclination.
Pro se parties fare poorly in attempts to certify, as did certification requests after an
adverse ruling. A pro se party has never had an issue certified in the Utah federal district court,

222

Years starting in 1986, when certification was first available.
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though six have tried. 223 Certification requests after an adverse ruling have succeeded only one
out of nine times. 224
While well over 60 federal cases issued certification orders, only 47 opinions from the
Utah Supreme Court answer certified questions. In three cases, the request was rejected. 225 No
explanation was given in the rejection orders. 226 Nine cases settled while the certified question
was pending in the Utah Supreme Court. 227 Six cases with certified questions are currently
pending in the Utah Supreme Court. 228
It is clear from the records that 14 of the Utah Supreme Court answers to certified
questions were case-dispositive, 229 by causing the case to settle or clarifying grounds for entry of
judgment soon after the certified question was answered. And other cases were likely aided by
answers but the cases had other issues that required additional motions or trial.

Certification of Questions of Utah Law from Federal Courts
Utah trial level federal courts, including district judges, bankruptcy judges and magistrate
judges have certified questions to the Utah Supreme Court. And the Tenth Circuit has also
certified questions. This section will examine the processes, standards and case patterns in these
courts. The processes in these courts to generate the certification orders are not identical.

Federal Court Certification Processes
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has a rule on certification of questions of state law,
adopted in 1999. 230 Very brief, it treats only five subjects:

223

See infra p. 45.

224

See infra pp. 44-45.

225

Novell v. Handiman, 2:01-cv-00173-TS; Kennard v. Leavitt, 2:01-cv-00171-DB; Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty., 2:90-cv248-BSJ.
226

In Kennard, 2:01-cv-00171-DB, the trial court record reflects that the Utah Supreme Court had two matters
pending that likely involved similar issues.
227

See infra pp. 60-61.

228

Mitchell v. Roberts, 2:16-cv-00843-EJF; HealthBanc Int’l, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc., 2:16-cv-00135-JNPPMW; GeoMetWatch v. Hall, 1:14-cv-00060-JNP-PMW; CR England v Swift, 2:14-cv-781-DB; In re Hendry, 2:14bk-27398-KA; Katterman v. Salt Lake Cty., 2:13-cv-01122-EJF.
229

230

See infra pp. 61-63.
Certification of Questions of State Law
(A) Certification; Abatement. When state law permits, this court may:
(1) certify a question arising under state law to that state's highest court according to that court's
rules; and
(2) abate the case in this court to await the state court's decision of the certified question.
(B) Motion. The court may certify on its own or on a party's motion.
(C) Time to File. A motion to certify should be filed at the same time as, but separately from, the moving
party's brief on the merits.
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•
•
•
•
•

authorization of certification and abatement of an appeal;
certification may be raised by a party or by the court;
any motion should be filed with, but separate from, a brief;
any response should be filed with the other party’s next brief or, if the motion was
filed with a reply brief, 14 days after the reply brief; and
the motion will be considered by the argument panel, at argument.

While the rule provides guidance, it has never been invoked successfully by a party seeking
certification.
In contrast, the Utah federal district and bankruptcy courts have no defined procedures
for promulgating certification orders. Because many judges sit on these courts and they always
make individual decisions, there is no uniform practice in these courts. As was seen in the
statistical summary, many successful certifications begin with the judge’s suggestion. In those
instances, parties are often directed to meet and confer, or submit proposed certification orders.
Sometimes a sua sponte certification may occur without party input.
Other successful certification processes begin with a motion. The motion process
includes briefing which may concur in the idea of certification and propose versions of the facts
and questions for an eventual order. Or a party may oppose another party’s motion to certify,
asserting the law is clear.
Certainly, the better orders are those in which parties and the judge participate in
formulation. The Utah Supreme Court advised this course: “In formulating the wording of the
questions to be certified, a few federal courts ask counsel for both sides to provide assistance.
However, most courts prepare the questions themselves without input from counsel which has, at
times, led to the wrong questions being asked.” 231

Federal Court Considerations for Certifying Questions of Utah Law
Because certification is discretionary, 232 there is precedent for the decision to certify and
for the decision not to certify. A discretionary decision may only be overturned if it is “an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” 233 On the background of
such discretion, the courts feel free to use broad language supporting their decision on a
certification motion. And these broad statements of law permitting certification or refusal

(D) Response; Time to File. A response may be filed at the same time as the answer or reply brief or within
14 days after the motion is served.
(E) When Considered. A motion to certify is ordinarily referred to the panel of judges assigned to decide
the appeal on the merits and is considered at the same time as the arguments on the merits.
10th Cir. R. 27.2.
231

In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d at 170.
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Armijo v. Ex Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Lehman Bros., 416 U.S. at 391).
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FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1555 (10th Cir. 1994).
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buttress future courts looking to support their discretionary, nearly irreversible decisions. Some
of the arguments made and authorities cited cannot, however, survive critical examination.
Arguments and Authorities Against Certification
One argument against a federal plaintiff’s motion to certify is that forum selection at
filing means that the filer trusts the forum to answer all legal questions presented, even if the
forum is federal and the question is one of state law. In rejecting a request to certify, the Tenth
Circuit stated: “One who chooses to litigate his state action in the federal forum must ordinarily
accept the federal court's reasonable interpretation of extant state law rather than seeking
extensions via the certification process.” 234 The quotation implies that certification is an
extension of the case schedule in federal court and assumes, contrary to usual thinking, that
plaintiffs favor delay. Usually, plaintiffs are anxious to conclude their claims—but they want the
claim decided on accurate, authoritative interpretations of state law. And a plaintiff’s selection of
a forum may involve many factors beyond selection an interpreter of law. 235
The Tenth Circuit has often, when rejecting a request to certify, reflected attitudes from
the era when certification was emerging and less proven. In that era of more dominant federal
control, federal courts assumed they were as well or better equipped to decide questions of state
law. In one instance, about six years after Utah’s certification process was implemented, the
Tenth Circuit expressed full confidence in its ability to predict Utah law:
The Utah Supreme Court has not yet considered the meaning of “sudden and
accidental” in the context of the pollution exclusion [in an insurance policy]. In
such a case of first impression, our responsibility is to give the clause the
interpretation we believe the Utah court would. We are informed by decisions of
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Littlefield, 131 F.3d 152, n.5 (citing Reynolds v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 989 F.2d. 465, 472 (11th Cir. 1993);
Croteau v. Olin Corp., 884 F.2d. 45, 46 (1st Cir. 1989); Armijo, 843 F.2d at 407).
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A corollary is that a plaintiff who is involuntarily in federal court after removal from state court is not entitled to
certification. The Tenth Circuit rejected that absolute rule:
[W]e are unable to discern when a federal district court, under plaintiff-appellant's argument,
would ever be able to deny certification in a Utah case that had been removed if there were any
possible argument that there is uncertainty on the Utah law. Any plaintiff seeking redress under
Utah law whose case was subsequently removed to federal court would be able to raise the same
argument Ms. Copier has, and if the district court could not rule out even the slightest degree of
uncertainty in the law of the state, it could never deny certification. Such a rule would be clearly
wrong.
Copier, 138 F.3d at 839.

Of the six cases removed to Utah federal district court in which certification was sought, certification was
granted in three. Carson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 2:09-cv-00663-DB; Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Justice Servs.,
2:09-cv-00030-DAK (certification granted; answer dispositive); Anderson v. Toomey, 2:07-cv-00673-TS; Jensen v.
State of Utah, 2:05-cv-00739-TS; Clark v. United States, 2:98-cv-00304-DB (certification granted; answer
dispositive); Soter's Inc., v. Deseret Fed., 2:89-cv-00979-DB (certification granted; answer dispositive).
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the Utah appellate courts and by precedent of federal courts in this and other
circuits. 236
That case then decided the issue using cases from the First, Second and Sixth Circuits, the State
of New York, and the Utah Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit did not consider the possibility
of certification to the Utah Supreme Court for an authoritative answer.
The Tenth Circuit has also said “[c]ertification is not to be routinely invoked whenever a
federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law.” 237 One oft-cited reason for the
federal court to proceed to answer a state law question was stated in the 1943 U.S. Supreme
Court opinion in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven. 238 “[I]t has from the first been deemed to be
the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of state
law whenever necessary to the rendition of a judgment.” 239 That statement was made, however,
long before certification procedures were in place, and in a case in which the Court of Appeals
had directed the trial court to dismiss without prejudice so that the plaintiff could refile in state
court. 240 The U.S. Supreme Court directed that the judgment of the district court, deciding the
issue, be reinstated. 241 Meredith was decided when the only alternatives for a federal court
considering an issue of state law were to decide the issue or abstain. Meredith could not consider
certification. Certification, where a forum is maintained, is very different than abstention, where
the federal court denies its services. In an era when certification is available in all states but one,
Meredith’s statement about the duties of trial courts should not be cited.
As recently as 2005, in Society of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart the Tenth Circuit stated that
“[w]hile certification is appropriate ‘where the legal question at issue is novel and the applicable
state law is unsettled,’ it is never compelled.” 242 For that last phrase, the Lloyd’s opinion cited
Lehman Bros. v. Schein 243 which is a pro-certification opinion that
•

does not use the word “compelled,” but states that even where certification is
available, it is never “obligatory”;
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Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 962 F.2d at, 1487-88.
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Armijo, 843 F.2d at 407 (citing L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 629 F.Supp. 1419, 1425 (D. Conn. 1986)).
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320 U.S. 228 (1943). Despite its age, this precedent continues to be used. L. Cohen & Co., cited above, relied on
it and cited other pre-1960’s case law such as R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); and Cty. of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
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Teleperformance Grp. USA, 2:08-cv-00395-PMW, docket no. 126, filed February 4, 2009; Order on Motions to
Dismiss, Jensen, 2:05-cv-00739-TS, docket no. 52, filed June 16, 2006, 2006 WL 1702585, at *21 (D. Utah June 16,
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led off that paragraph with a sentence and footnote clarifying that certification was
only available in nine states at the time of the opinion; 244
noted that certification “does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism”; and
remanded so the lower court could consider certification.

Lloyd’s and Lehman also cited Meredith v. Winter Haven, decided in the abstention era. As stated
above, that case law is of little value now that certification is readily available. Reliance on
Lehman Bros. as speaking against certification is flawed.
The Tenth Circuit has also cited a Florida case for the proposition that certification “is to
be utilized with restraint and distinction.” 245 For several reasons, this citation in Ormsbee
Development Company v. Grace is misleading.
The careless citation of the case is revealed by Ormsbee’s use of the word “distinction.”
That word does not appear in the Florida opinion. Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp. actually
stated: “We use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying.” 246 The erroneous use of
the word “distinction” has been perpetuated by its use in Ormsbee. 247 But it has also been
corrected. In spite of Ormsbee’s misquotation, District Judge Bruce Jenkins cited Ormsbee using
the correct word from Shevin: “While the decision to certify is discretionary and certification
should be used with restraint . . . .” 248
More important than the use of the wrong word, Shevin is actually not a case to use
against certification. The case should be seen in its perspective as coming from Florida, the first
state with a certification process. Further, the quotation should be placed in context of the
opinion’s general endorsement of the certification process:
[O]nly the Florida Supreme Court can decide this state law question in a manner
that is, by definition, correct. Thus the defendants' strong urging that the issue be
certified to that Court has considerable force. Both the United States Supreme
Court and this Court have lauded the certification process, not only because it
produces definitive answers but also because it ‘helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism’. However, as has been noted by Chief Judge Brown, one of the
strongest advocates of the process, certification should never be automatic or
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Forty-nine states now have certification rules. Eisenberg, supra n.59.
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Ormsbee Dev. Co. v. Grace, 668 F.2d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.,
526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976)).
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Reynolds v. United States, CIV.A. 98-B-1003, 2000 WL 134550, at *1 (D. Colo. January 21, 2000); L. Cohen &
Co., 629 F.Supp. at 1424.
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unthinking. ‘We use much judgment, restraint and discretion in certifying. We do
not abdicate.’ 249
[W]e decline to certify the state law question in this case to the Florida Supreme
Court. In taking this action, we intend to cast no doubt on the general efficacy of
the certification process. And we certainly recognize the supremacy of the Florida
Supreme Court as interpreter of state law . . . . 250
And the case had many reasons certification was not used. The plaintiff was the Attorney
General of the State of Florida:
We have before us the Attorney General, elected by the people of Florida, whose
opinions on questions involving the duties of various state officials are persuasive,
though certainly not binding, in Florida courts. He has brought this action in what
he has determined to be the public interest and has proceeded for two years
without apparent opposition from the Florida Legislature or the state
governmental entities he purports to represent. To impede the progress of this
action through the certification process itself seems to us to involve some
disregard of the state governmental processes that comity principles require us to
respect. 251
There were also strong practical reasons not to certify in Shevin. Shevin was an “antitrust
action against seventeen major oil companies” which the trial court dismissed, directing the
parties to proceed with a declaratory action in state court before the federal court would hear
their antitrust claims. 252 The Shevin appeal was presented after the case had been pending two
years and stated only federal claims. 253
And there was abundant state precedent on the question presented:
[T]he narrow issue of the Florida Attorney General’s standing to bring this action
does not seem to us an extremely close one. And we come to this conclusion with
the aid of a long line of Florida decisions . . . as well as the body of common law
dealing with the powers of attorneys general. This clearly is not a case in which
we are required to ‘guess’ state law from one or two questionable precedents. 254
Shevin’s circumstances, praise of the certification process, comparison with available
alternatives, and broad language in favor of certification in its careful—not casual—analysis
249
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Cir. 1975)) (citations omitted).

250

Id. at 276.

251

Id. at 275.

252

Id. at 267.

253

Id. at 275.

254

Id.

39

makes citation of Shevin against certification improper. And returning to Ormsbee, the Tenth
Circuit case citing Shevin, certification was never really viable. In Orsmbee, the court said
“certification . . . is not appropriate when, as here, the issue certified would not be determinative
of the issues before us on appeal.” 255 So, Orsmbee should not be cited against certification.
Criteria for Certification
Two opinions from the Utah district court have stated certification is appropriate “when
the case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely recur in other
cases, where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the case, and
where the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the
issue.” 256 District Judge Dale Kimball’s language was cited by District Judge Jill Parrish, but she
added an additional point, extending beyond his last criterion: “And the United States Supreme
Court has instructed that federal district courts may avail themselves of state certification
procedures when facing ‘[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law.’” 257
Judges Kimball and Parrish list five instances when certification is appropriate:
1. when the case concerns a matter of vital public concern;
2. where the issue will likely recur in other cases;
3. where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the
case;
4. where the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear
path on the issue; and
5. when facing “[n]ovel, unsettled questions of state law.” 258
In an extensive footnote, when considering certification sua sponte, Judge Bruce Jenkins
cited language from a Tenth Circuit opinion 259 which correlates with the last three criteria used
by Judges Kimball and Parrish. The Circuit opinion used language from the Uniform Act (1995).
When the Circuit opinion borrowed the standards of the Uniform Act (1995) in setting standards
for the certifying court, the state law became federal precedent:
The Tenth Circuit has determined that certification is appropriate where it appears
that the question to be certified may be determinative of the action now pending
255
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Memorandum Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court, Carranza v. Mountainlands
Health Clinic, 2:07-cv-00291-DAK, docket no. 31, filed May 14, 2009, 2009 WL 1392839, at *4 (D. Utah May 14,
2009) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Memorandum
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before the federal court and where there is no controlling authority on the
question from the state's highest court or its intermediate appellate court. 260
The Uniform Act (1995) criteria are also the likely foundation of the last three criteria in the
Kimball-Parrish list above.
District Judge Jenkins also added that certification is appropriate “where the question has
not been addressed by the state courts with ‘sufficient clarity.’ ” 261 Thus, even if a question had
been addressed by the state court, but without precision, certification could be used as an
opportunity for state law to be made more understandable.
The criteria established illustrate the major purposes of certification—some of which are
in conflict when the practical impact of certification is considered. One consideration is case
specific—the issue certified must be case determinative. But other case specific considerations
such as time and expense may push against certification. And other considerations are systemic.
The existence of a novel question of law, unsettled by state authority, likely to bear in other
cases, requires the court and parties to look beyond their current case. This is an opportunity for
counsel and the court to look at the larger purposes of the judicial system and the respective roles
of federal and state courts. Comity and federalism are much larger than any current case and
future cases. So, those factors external to the case may drive a case to bear a burden for the
benefit of others. The parties are most likely to emphasize the case specific factors, unless one of
them is a recurrent litigant or a governmental entity. Therefore, the court must require the parties
to address factors external to the case and may need to develop those factors itself if the parties
do not adequately address them.

Motion to Certify Denied
As stated earlier, in about half of cases in which certification is considered, no question is
certified. There are several common reasons.
No State Law Question. Of course, certification is not needed if the state law question is
not decisive. Framing the issues in the case can make certification irrelevant. In SEC v. Merrill
Scott Limited, 262 District Judge Tena Campbell rejected an attempt to “certify a question of Utah
property and trust law to the Utah Supreme Court regarding a trust beneficiary's ability to control
property held in trust.” 263 At the hearing, she stated “This is not a state law question. This is a
question of securities transactions, the antifraud provisions.” 264 In her later order denying
certification she added: “The Tenth Circuit has made clear that certification is appropriate only
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where novel or unsettled issues of state law exist. . . . This case turns on the application of federal
law . . . .” 265
Utah Law is Clear. In Evans v. State of Utah, 266 same-sex couple plaintiffs alleged
deprivation of their property and liberty interests resulting from the State of Utah's failure to
recognize same-sex marriages solemnized in the time between issuance of an order in the District
Court validating such marriages and a stay of that order entered by the U.S. Supreme Court. 267
Defendants filed two motions to certify issues to the Utah Supreme Court. District Judge Dale
Kimball denied the motions: “Because Utah law is clear and not ultimately controlling of the
case before this court, the court concludes that there is no basis for certifying the state law
questions to the Utah Supreme Court.” 268
No Unusual Difficulty in Deciding. In Society of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 269 certification was
not used sua sponte by the Tenth Circuit because the issue was not hard to resolve:
While no Utah court has rendered a decision on the precise issue in question, our
analysis above establishes that there is no unusual difficulty in deciding the state
law question or a likelihood that Lloyd's theory of liability would be adopted by
the Utah courts. Thus, given the above conclusions, certification is
unnecessary. 270
Failure to Disclose Known Authority. While a lack of candor with the court may not
doom a certification motion, it certainly played a role in Self v. Teleperformance Group USA. 271
Magistrate Judge Paul Warner noted that the decisive issue on which certification was sought had
been ruled on by another judge in the district recently, and that counsel clearly knew of the
decision because counsel was also engaged in that other case:
Two weeks after Judge Stewart’s October 1, 2008 decision was rendered in Sweat,
Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the motion to certify in this case but, for whatever reason,
failed to mention Judge Stewart’s ruling in Sweat. It is not lost on the court that
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not believe it was necessary to request certification of the
above-referenced issue until after Judge Stewart ruled against the plaintiffs on the
same issue in Sweat. 272

265

Order at 3, Merrill Scott Ltd., 2:02-cv-00039-TC, docket no. 970, filed May 2, 2007.

266

2:14-cv-00055-DAK.

267

Memorandum Decision and Order, Evans, 2:14-cv-00055-DAK, docket no. 45, filed May 19, 2014.

268

Id. at 34.

269

402 F.3d 982.

270

Id. at 1002.

271

2:08-cv-00395-PMW.

272
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Timing of Motion, After Party Asserts Law is Clear. A party seeking certification
should at the latest raise it when a dispositive motion raises the issue. In American National
Property v. McNeely, 273 District Judge Dale Kimball pointed out the danger in waiting too long.
The motion was made three days before a hearing and denied a day after the hearing.
The court considers Defendant’s present motion to be untimely. A party cannot
assert that Utah law is clear on an issue and then seek redress from another court
when it receives an unfavorable ruling. At this stage of the litigation, if Defendant
disagrees with the court’s analysis, his recourse is to file an appeal to the Tenth
Circuit. Defendant can ask the Tenth Circuit to certify the issue prior to its
analysis of the issue. Prior to this court’s analysis of the issue, Defendant’s only
position was that the issue was clear and that the court should certify the question
only if the court thought it was unclear or disagreed with Defendant. [The Court’s
d]isagreement with a party’s position does not make the issue unclear. 274
When a motion suggests the issue, certification should be raised. Stating that the law is clear will
work against a party later seeking certification, who must necessarily claim the law is not settled.
Motion Made After Adverse Decision. A motion is clearly untimely after an adverse
decision. Perhaps the untimeliest motion was made in another case District Judge Dale Kimball
handled. In Utah Division of Forestry v. United States, 275 the motion was made in 2004, three
years after a summary judgment ruling.
In 1.800. Vending v. Wyland, 276 the motion was not as late, and District Judge Clark
Waddoups explained why a motion to certify is too late when made after an adverse ruling:
Surprisingly, Defendants believed the court had sufficient guidance to rule in
Defendants’ favor on the motion for summary judgment and sought certification
only after the court rejected its argument. If such a procedure were to be allowed,
it would in effect allow a party to make a motion, argue the merits, and then after
losing on an issue, use certification as an interlocutory appeal from an interim
decision by a federal court to the Utah Supreme Court. 277
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In six other cases a motion to certify was made after an adverse ruling and denied, 278 but in one
case a district judge granted a motion to certify after an adverse ruling was made against the
movant. 279
The Tenth Circuit has stated: “We generally will not certify questions to a state supreme
court when the requesting party seeks certification only after having received an adverse decision
from the district court.” 280
Prematurity. Sometimes the determinative issues have not emerged, making certification
at an early stage unwise. In Spurlino v. Holcim, District Judge Jill Parrish denied a motion to
certify for that reason: “While the court agrees that certification of the question may eventually
be appropriate, it would be premature to do so now. . . . At this early stage of the proceeding,
Plaintiff has not developed a factual record showing it would benefit [from the issue of law].” 281
Pro Se Movants. Pro se parties also fare poorly when asking for certification. 282 In
Edwards v. Utah Board of Pardons, 283 a pro se habeas petitioner sought post-conviction relief
from a state criminal sentence and almost a year after the District Court dismissed his petition for
failure to exhaust state remedies, 284 the petitioner filed a motion for certification. 285 The motion
did not propose a question to certify—it only requested the clerk certify and transmit all records
to the Utah Supreme Court. That motion was found moot 286 after the petitioner’s appeal. The
Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as untimely because the appeal was filed five months after the
District Court dismissed his petition. 287
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No Stated Reason. Sometimes, no reason for
denial is given. Because the decision is entirely
discretionary, even a brief denial will suffice. In
Whiteman v. Friel, 288 District Judge Tena Campbell
denied the motion by endorsement. 289
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. In Haik
v. Salt Lake County Board of Health 290 the District Court and Tenth Circuit denied motions to
certify because the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Remarkable Cases
For several reasons, cases involving certification may be remarkable. Certification creates
a unique interplay between two sovereigns. By the nature of the process, the issues certified are
significant. In these first 30 years of the Utah experience, some cases have procedural features
worth examining. The personalities of judges involved may impress themselves on the various
orders and opinions. Lawyer and party strategies make each case unique. This section of the
thesis will examine some cases that deserve attention beyond their contribution to the pattern of
cases in which certification was considered and used.
Reformulation: In the first case 291 which reformulated a certified question, the Utah
Supreme Court reviewed the history of certification generally and in Utah. “The practice of
certifying questions of state law to a state supreme court is a fairly recent device that arose from
the judge-made doctrine of abstention, whereby a federal court would abstain until the state court
had resolved the state questions.” 292 The opinion noted U.S. Supreme Court approval of
certification and the constitutional infirmities in Utah’s 1975 Certification Rule. Then, the
opinion explained why the need for reformulation arises (lack of lawyer participation in
formulation); 293 how the need is accommodated by the federal court (by an express statement
that “the particular phrasing of the question should not restrict the state court from reformulating
the question as it sees fit”); 294 the power of the receiving court to reformulate a question; 295 and
why the Utah Supreme Court found it necessary to reformulate the question. 296 The opinion did
not note the lack of an express reformulation provision in Utah’s Rule 41.
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That case is also interesting because it was a 3-2 decision, with the dissent boldly stating
it “would advise the bankruptcy court to employ the guidelines set out in this dissenting
opinion.” 297 The bankruptcy court followed the position of the majority. 298
An unfinished order: A
mechanical problem required two
certification orders in Gardner v.
Galetka, 299 The first certification order 300
was unfinished—omitting the certified
question—and rejected for not containing
the federal court’s statement of the
question submitted. 301 The corrected order
containing the questions was submitted after briefing four months later. 302
Public policy exceptions to at-will employment: Among the high-profile cases which
have turned on certified questions is Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 303 Utah is an at-will
employment state, but a wrongful termination suit may be maintained if a termination violates
public policy. The plaintiff-employees responded to shoplifting incidents where the shoplifters
were armed. They did not follow Wal-Mart policy to withdraw but instead pinned the shoplifters
and confiscated the weapons. They were then terminated. The question whether this stated a
violation of the Utah policy of self-defense was certified sua sponte and answered. The Utah
Supreme court held that self-defense resulting in termination may give rise to a wrongful
termination claim and is an exception to the rule of at-will employment, but limited the exception
to circumstances where an employee reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
against an imminent threat of serious bodily harm and the employee has no opportunity to
withdraw. 304
Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc. 305 is another at-will employment case in which certification
was important. In response to the question about another public policy exception to at-will
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employment, the Utah Supreme Court held 306 that retaliatory discharge for seeking workers’
compensation violates public policy, so that a wrongful discharge claim is recognized as an
exception to the general rule of at-will employment. But the court declined to recognize causes
of action for harassment or discrimination 307 or for retaliatory discharge for an opposing
employer’s treatment of fellow employees who applied for workers’ compensation benefits. 308
Certification reviews state court proceedings: Some certification cases illustrate the
interplay between state and federal courts, even beyond the certification process. Richardson v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp. 309 was a federal case brought against different
defendants following a state case arising out of the same automobile accident. The question was
the effect of the state case on the federal case. Plaintiffs brought a negligence action in Utah state
court against various parties involved in an accident but did not include Navistar International
Transportation Corp. (“Navistar”) or Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the state court jury returned a special verdict allocating 100% of fault among the
named defendants. The parties to that suit settled before the damages stage of the trial, and the
state trial court entered a judgment of dismissal with prejudice.
Plaintiffs then filed an action against Navistar and Toyota in federal district court
asserting negligence and strict product liability claims. Defendants raised the defense of
collateral estoppel and moved to dismiss the suit based on the state jury’s allocation of 100% of
the fault in the prior state court proceeding. The district court granted Navistar and Toyota’s
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs appealed.
The Tenth Circuit then certified a question 310 to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah
Supreme Court held that because “the parties reached a settlement before the state court entered
a judgment allocating fault pursuant to the Liability Reform Act . . . the jury's verdict on
allocation had no binding or preclusive effect on any party or court.” The Tenth Circuit then held
that the federal action was not barred by collateral estoppel, and the law of the case doctrine
applied after the Utah Supreme Court opinion to preclude a federal court from considering
whether Utah’s comparative negligence law required allocation of all fault in one action. 311 The
District Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the
parties stipulated to dismissal, presumably in settlement. 312
Soter’s Inc., v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, 313 is another federal case
showing the inter-relations of state and federal courts. The case was tried to a jury in state
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court. 314 Post-trial motions raised issues with the meaning of the jury’s answers to interrogatories
on issues of waiver. But before the motions could be resolved, the defendant was put into a
federal receivership. 315 The receiver then removed the action to federal court. District Judge
Bruce Jenkins certified seven questions on the Utah law of waiver. 316 The Supreme Court
decided that the state court jury was improperly instructed, which effectively required a new
trial. But because the Supreme Court was hearing certified questions rather than an appeal, the
Supreme Court did not even suggest a new trial. That procedural decision was for the federal
judge, who then re-tried the case in federal court. 317 On request of a federal court, the Utah
Supreme Court decided that a state trial court had misapplied Utah law.
In a third case, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to determine the effect of one of its
own orders. In Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Wisan, 318 the Tenth
Circuit asked the Utah Supreme Court whether its dismissal of an application for an
extraordinary writ due to laches was a final decision on the merits so that res judicata applied to
bar similar claims in a federal civil suit. The district court “attempted to discern the Utah
Supreme Court's likely approach.” 319 But the Tenth Circuit, on appeal, decided to certify the
question to the Utah Supreme Court, noting that “[c]ertification by this court in no way implies
an abuse of discretion by the district court in failing to certify, but only indicates our independent
judgment on the question.” 320 The Utah Supreme Court determined that its decision on the writ
had preclusive effect, 321 so the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and
remanded. 322 Following the Tenth Circuit's directive, the district court dismissed the action on res
judicata grounds. 323
Tenth Circuit Recommends Certification: McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 324
like Fundamentalist Church, is a case in which the Tenth Circuit certified a question decided by
the district judge. The Circuit stated its view of the need to certify a little differently than it had
stated it in Fundamentalist Church:
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Needless to say, the outcome of this proceeding turns upon important state law
questions of public policy, statutory interpretation, and insurance contract
construction which we believe the Supreme Court of Utah should have the
opportunity to address in the first instance. Therefore, we conclude certification of
the above questions would further the interests of comity and federalism by giving
the Supreme Court of Utah an opportunity to answer the questions should it elect
to do so under Utah R.App. P. 41(e). 325
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge and the Tenth Circuit affirmed in a very
brief opinion. 326
Multiple attempts at certification: Iverson v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company 327
tells counsel seeking certification to keep trying. District Judge Dee Benson refused to certify a
question about automobile insurance, stating “[i]n light of Utah statutory language, as well as
cases from this and other jurisdictions, there is enough guidance for this Court to make a
determination without the need to certify.” 328 But after a chambers conference four months
later, 329 and another chambers conference two months after that, 330 he certified a differently
stated question. 331 From the first motion 332 to the order certifying, nine months elapsed.
Quick certification: Tight cooperation between the federal district court and the Utah
Supreme Court was demonstrated in Utah Republican Party v. Herbert. 333 The case, filed on
January 15, 2016, challenged election procedures modified by the Utah State Legislature in
2015. Four days after the case was filed, the district court ordered the parties to meet, confer and
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submit questions to certify. 334 Ten days later, the plaintiff and defendant filed a joint motion to
certify. 335 A certification order issued six days later. 336
The next day, the Utah Democratic Party moved to intervene and moved to certify
another question. Six days later, after accelerated briefing, a second certification order issued
with two questions. 337
The Utah Supreme Court’s opinion issued April 8, 2016. 338 It declined to answer the third
question, stating that it was “based on ambiguous statements of intent by different
representatives of the Republican Party.” 339 “[R]elief, premised on hypothetical future facts, is
inappropriate in this procedural setting.” 340 “[T]here is no controversy ripe for resolution . . .
.” 341
The certification process, from the suggestion of the need on January 19, 2016, to the
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court on April 8th, took less than three months.
Construing a clear statute under the rule against absurdity: In Garfield County v.
United States, 342 the Utah Supreme Court construed a clear statute contrary to its language to
avoid an absurd result. The case was one of dozens brought by Utah counties to declare rights of
way across federal land. Litigants in multiple cases had raised as a defense Utah Code § 78B–2–
201(1), which imposes a seven-year time period for the state to bring an action for title to
property. The federal courts questioned whether this statute and its predecessor were statutes of
limitations or statutes of repose. Three district judges joined in a sua sponte certification order,
formulated with input from the parties. The Utah Supreme Court accepted the question:
We hold that the plain language of both versions of the statute reveals them to be
statutes of repose. . . . Because of the absurdity that results from applying section
201 and its predecessor as statutes of repose in this context, we construe these
statutes as statutes of limitations with respect to R.S. 2477 right of way claims.
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The Utah Supreme Court found that the plain language of the statute, applied in a dispute with
the federal government, created the absurd result of terminating causes of action before they
existed.
We hold that the plain language of both versions of the statute reveals them to be
statutes of repose. The application of this interpretation to the State's R.S. 2477
rights of way leads to the result that the State effectively and inevitably lost title
to any such rights of way after seven years without any opportunity to prevent
such loss. This result—the automatic expiration of the State's title to R.S. 2477
rights of way—is absurd . . . . 343
The opinion has a strong dissent by two Utah Court of Appeals judges who sat on the case. Judge
Fred Voros, the author, summarized:
[T]he claimed absurd result—that Utah would enjoy rights of way granted by the
United States without a judicial remedy for quieting title to them against the
United States—was the prevailing law nationwide for 106 years, from the passage
of the Mining Act in 1866 until the passage of the Quiet Title Act in 1972.
For this reason, I believe the majority opinion represents the most expansive
application of the absurdity doctrine in American law. I am unaware of the
absurdity doctrine ever being employed, in Utah or elsewhere, to reject as absurd
not a proposed rule of law, but a long-existing rule of law—in this case, a rule of
law governing all American states and territories for over a century. If that rule of
law in fact mandated absurd results, surely in 106 years some court somewhere
would have noticed. Yet no party cites, nor am I able to discover, any court
questioning the rationality of the rule of law that we today declare absurd. 344
In Garfield County, the Utah Supreme Court was of divided views, as it had been in In re West
Side Property Associates. 345 But in Garfield County, the dissent did not “advise the [federal]
court to employ the guidelines set out in this dissenting opinion.” 346
Significant Legal Issues
Answers to certified questions have clarified many significant aspects of Utah law. The
unique questions presented by certification have enhanced Utah law, by authoritative
declarations from the Utah Supreme Court.
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In Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 347 District Judge Thomas Greene, with input from
counsel, certified three questions. 348 These questions arose out of Mrs. Hansen’s presence while
four other plaintiffs, including her son, received electric shocks in the waters behind a Sea-Ray
boat at Lake Powell. The Utah Supreme Court summarized the threshold issue: “Plaintiffs ask us
to expand the zone of danger rule [for negligent infliction of emotional injury] found in the
Restatement to include recovery for persons who are not actually within the zone of danger but
who reasonably and subjectively believe they are in danger.” 349 The Court answered in the
negative: “We decline to extend recovery to those outside the zone of danger even though they
may reasonably fear for their own safety and even though they may witness injury to a close
relative.” 350
In Burkholz v. Joyce, 351 a victim of years of alleged sexual abuse sued her abuser. The
case was filed before enactment of a Utah statute of limitation specific to child abuse claims
which provided additional time to assert these claims. The plaintiff also alleged tolling by
minority, mental disability, and the discovery rule. 352 On these difficult facts, the Utah Supreme
Court determined the statute of limitations barred the claims: “In making this decision we in no
way mean to discount the trauma Burkholz has suffered. However, . . . we find ourselves
constrained by the policy underlying the statute of limitations and principles underlying the
discovery rule's narrow exception to the statute of limitations and conclude that under these
circumstances, no other result is tenable.” 353
Carranza v. Mountainlands Health Clinic, 354 raised the issue of existence of a claim for
wrongful death of an unborn child. The Utah Supreme Court determined—with a two-justice
majority, a two justice concurrence in the result, and a one justice dissent—that such a claim
does exist. 355 From acceptance of the difficult question to issuance of its multi-part opinion, the
Utah Supreme Court required 28 months.
In Miller v. United States, 356 John and Joan Miller filed a suit in federal court to recover
for injuries in an auto accident. The defendant was an employee of the United States Air Force
who had been drinking liquor at the Noncommissioned Officers Club at Hill Air Force Base. The
Millers’ complaint included a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) alleging that
Mr. Valle had been negligently and carelessly served alcohol at the club in violation of the Utah
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Dramshop Act and that the federal government, as the dramshop, was liable for the Millers’
injuries. District Judge Tena Campbell’s certification order 357 cited Utah cases holding that the
strict liability Utah Dramshop Act is an exclusive remedy, eliminating a state law claim for
negligence which is an essential predicate to an FTCA claim. Judge Campbell’s order also cited a
Seventh Circuit case 358 holding that even if a state dramshop act eliminated a state court claim
for negligence, the negligence claim should survive for the limited purpose of supporting an
FTCA claim. In essence, the Seventh Circuit (without certifying the question to the Illinois
Supreme Court) declared a narrow exception to the exclusive remedy of the Illinois dramshop act
for purposes of the FTCA.
In response to the questions in Miller, the Utah Supreme Court held 359 that Utah's
Dramshop Act was a strict liability statute, and that “Utah does not recognize a common law
cause of action in negligence for the sale of alcohol to persons who cause injury to third parties
while under the influence of alcohol.” 360 A separate opinion concurred in the result but dissented,
because the majority’s opinion went beyond the question certified. 361
Certifications by Article I Judges
In several cases, judges appointed under Article I of the U.S. Constitution have issued
certification orders when they are responsible to decide controlling issues. This occurs when a
bankruptcy judge is conducting an adversary proceeding or when a magistrate judge handles a
civil case on consent of the parties.
Cases certified by bankruptcy judges include In re West Side Properties, 362 from
Bankruptcy Judge Judith Boulden; In re Kunz 363 and In re Rockwell 364 jointly certified by
Bankruptcy Judges Glen Clark and William Thurman; In re Simmons 365 certified by Bankruptcy
Judge Kimball Mosier; and In re Hendry 366 and In re Kiley 367 certified by Bankruptcy Judge
Kevin Anderson.
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Cases certified by Magistrate Judges include National Indemnity et al v. United States
Sports Specialty 368 certified by Magistrate Judge Brooke Wells while the case was pending
consent and Katterman v. Salt Lake County 369 and Mitchell v. Roberts 370 certified by Magistrate
Judge Evelyn Furse. Magistrate Judge Paul Warner considered but rejected certification in Self v.
Teleperformance Group USA. 371
The Role of Justice and Judge Parrish
Of all judges and justices involved in certification from the federal courts to the Utah
Supreme Court, save perhaps Justice Dallin Oaks who wrote the opinion invalidating the 1975
Certification Rule, Jill Parrish has the most prominent role. She served as a justice of the Utah
Supreme Court from 2003 to 2015 and in that capacity wrote six opinions on questions certified
from federal courts. Serving as a district judge in the District of Utah since August 2015, she has
already certified more questions to the Utah Supreme Court than any other federal judge. She is
the only person who has served in a judicial capacity on both sides of the certification process.
Opinions on Utah Supreme Court
In Smith v. United States she wrote the opinion 372 responding to questions certified by
District Judge Dee Benson. 373 The issue was whether a legislative cap on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases applied in cases of wrongful death and, if so whether the limitation
was valid under the Utah Constitution’s prohibition of such damage caps in wrongful death
cases. Justice Parrish’s unanimous opinion declared the cap unconstitutional in such cases. This
is the only opinion Justice Parrish wrote in response to questions certified from a trial court
judge.
Justice Parrish responded 374 to the Tenth Circuit’s certification 375 in In re Reinhart about
the effect of Utah garnishment exemptions in bankruptcy. The district court had affirmed a
decision of the bankruptcy court finding the Utah statutory exemption created a bankruptcy
exemption, 376 but on further appeal, the Tenth Circuit certified questions. Justice Parrish held
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that the garnishment exemption did not, by its terms, create a bankruptcy exemption. Then, the
Tenth Circuit remanded to the district court to remand to the bankruptcy court. 377
Justice Parrish’s opinion was the second she had written in In re Reinhart. Her first was
written a year earlier. 378 The earlier opinion was also in response to a Tenth Circuit
certification. 379 The issue on this appeal was an exemption of a retirement plan. Following the
answer of the Utah Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the exemption on the principal but
not on the earnings, reversing the trial court in part. 380
In Whitney v. Division of Juvenile Justice Services 381 Justice Parrish again wrote in
response to certification from the Tenth Circuit. 382 While the possibility of certification was
raised in the district court, the nine-line motion had only cursory argument. 383 The response to
the certified question confirmed the correctness of the district court decision, so the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 384
Justice Parrish also wrote for the court in Ohio Casualty Insurance Company v. Unigard
Insurance Company 385 in response to a question from the Tenth Circuit. 386 No question of
certification arose in the District Court on the issue of allocation of defense costs between
insurers, but the Utah Supreme Court answered the question of first impression supporting the
Tenth Circuit reversal of the District Court. 387
Justice Parrish responded to questions certified by the Tenth Circuit in Mecham v.
Frazier. 388 Justice Parrish held that immunity protected the state officers from suit, requiring the
Tenth Circuit to reverse the district judge’s denial of immunity on the state law claims. 389
Because a separate opinion of the Tenth Circuit had already reversed the district judge’s denial of
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qualified immunity on the federal claims, 390 the federal case was then dismissed by the federal
district court.
Five of the six opinions written by Justice Parrish were in response to questions from the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Of those, four resulted in trial court reversals. During her tenure
on the Utah Supreme Court, the Court issued twenty-seven opinions in response to certified
questions, eleven of which were certified from the Tenth Circuit. This background may in part
explain her readiness, as a district judge, to certify questions. She raises the possibility sua sponte
more than she faces it on motions—having received only one motion to certify in her cases. And
she denied that motion.
Questions Certified as District Court Judge
Judge Parrish first faced certification as a district court judge in Spurlino v. Holcim 391
Judge Parrish denied a motion to certify questions about the Utah Uniform Unfair Practices Act.
She stated:
While the court agrees that certification of the question may eventually be
appropriate, it would be premature to do so now. . . . Plaintiff has not developed a
factual record showing it would benefit from the [competitive injury] inference, if
such an inference is indeed permissible under Utah law. Additionally, Defendants
argue they have defenses that will defeat Plaintiff’s claims even if the . . .
inference applies. 392
At almost the same time, in Dircks v. Travelers Indemnity Company of America, 393 Judge
Parrish suggested that claims for declaratory relief regarding underinsured motorist coverage
required interpretation of the Utah statute, making certification advisable. 394 The parties provided
input and a certification order issued with a single question. 395 The question was answered 396 and
judgment was entered for the plaintiff. 397
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Two questions regarding Utah insurance laws were certified in Lancer Insurance Co. v.
Lake Shore Motor Coach Lines, 398 after Judge Parrish obtained input from the parties. Both
questions were answered, 399 resulting in declaratory judgment against the insurer. 400
In Zimmerman v. University of Utah, simultaneous with an order on two dispositive
motions, Judge Parrish certified three questions 401 regarding Utah’s constitutional free speech
clause and employment law. The questions were accepted, but only one was answered due to
poor briefing by the parties. 402
Judge Parrish suggested certification of questions about a Utah statute of limitations at
argument of a motion to dismiss in Loveridge v. Prudential Insurance Company of America. 403
The defendant-movant requested a 21-day stay and then withdrew the motion. The case settled
shortly thereafter.
In GeoMetWatch v. Hall, 404 Judge Parrish certified three questions about governmental
immunity to the Utah Supreme Court sua sponte 405 but on the parties’ motions, substantially
amended the questions and expanded the order. 406 The questions are pending at the Utah
Supreme Court. 407
In Flores v. Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake, 408 Judge Parrish certified
two governmental immunity questions, 409 but revoked her order 21 days later when the case
settled. 410
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The application of the economic loss rule to fraudulent inducement claims was certified
by Judge Parrish in HealthBanc International, LLC v. Synergy Worldwide, Inc. 411 The case is
pending at the Utah Supreme Court. 412
Recently Judge Parrish ordered “the parties to meet, confer, and submit a proposed
statement of facts and proposed questions for certification” in Burningham v. Wright Medical
Group. 413 They did so, and she signed the certification order. 414 The case is pending at the Utah
Supreme Court.
The influence of Justice and Judge Parrish is unique because of her positions the Utah
federal district court and the Utah Supreme Court. Those courts are most involved in certified
questions of Utah law. Her inclination to raise the issue sua sponte may influence other judges to
consider certification more often.

Impact of Certification on Cases
The certification process impacts cases. While an authoritative decision on state law is
the desired result of the process, there are other benefits. The mere filing of a motion to certify,
or the pendency of a motion, or entry of a certification order may cause a case to settle. And as
would be expected, the answer to a certified question may provide a basis for settlement or for
entry of an order deciding a dispositive motion.
Certification Motion Causes Cases to Settle
The mere suggestion of certification may advance a case—perhaps by focusing a critical
issue, or perhaps by creating a concern about delay. In Loveridge v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, 415 District Judge Jill Parrish expressed the inclination to certify a question
of applicability of a statute of limitations after hearing arguments on a motion to dismiss. 416
Defendant then requested a three-week stay of the case, withdrew the motion to dismiss and a
few months later, the parties filed a stipulated notice of dismissal. 417
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At a final pretrial conference in Jeppson v. Thoman, 418 District Judge David Sam directed
the parties to prepare an order certifying an issue under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Instead, a motion for summary judgment was filed six weeks later, and the case settled six
months after that. In the interim, time had been extended for any response to the motion.
In Davis County Construction v. Davis County, 419 the case settled eighteen months after
the certification motion was filed. On the same day the motion was filed, an order from District
Judge David Sam set an accelerated briefing schedule and gave notice of a hearing five days
later—which was apparently never held.
Cases Settle While Questions Pend in Utah Supreme Court
In at least nine other instances, cases have settled while certification is pending after a
certification order is sent to the Utah Supreme Court. The time between entry of the order and
settlement may range from days to a year. During that time, the parties examine—and perhaps
brief—their positions. The close look at the controlling issues which are certified, and the spectre
of additional time and expense to complete litigation facilitates settlement.
Flores v. Unified Police Department of Greater Salt Lake 420 moved very quickly. The
question was certified April 3, 2017, and amended April 21, 2017—and the case was
dismissed April 24, 2017.
Gibbs v. Unum Life Insurance Company of America 421 settled a week after the
certification order issued.
Pace v. Swerdlow 422 settled less than two months after a question was certified.
In Westport Insurance v. Ong, 423 an order of certification was followed within two weeks
by a motion to amend it. In the course of resolution of that motion, the parties settled the
case less than four months later.
Haights Creek Irrigation Company v. United Technologies 424 was dismissed less than
four months after the certification order issued.
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Johnson v. Riddle 425 and In re Hendry 426 settled six months after the certification order
issued.
In McCourt v. Semken, 427 the Utah Supreme Court did not respond to accept or reject a
November 1989 certification order until January 1991 and then the plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed the case in December 1991.
Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Company 428 settled a year after the certification order issued.
Answer to Certified Questions Causes Cases to Settle
In another 12 cases, the answer to the certified issues apparently assisted in settlement.
A retaliatory termination cause of action based on reporting co-worker law violations was
determined not to exist in the Utah Supreme Court’s answer 429 to the question posed in
Fox v. MCI Communications Corp. 430 The case promptly resolved.
In Spackman v. Board of Education of Box Elder County, 431 the Utah Supreme Court’s
determination 432 that two state constitutional provisions were self-executing, thus
validating two of the plaintiff’s causes of action, enabled a settlement.
Egbert, v. Nissan North America 433 resolved after two certification orders issued by
District Judges Paul Cassell and Dee Benson (successively presiding in the case). Issues
certified related to Utah tort law. The parties settled before resolution of a summary
judgment motion filed after the opinions 434 were received from the Utah Supreme Court.
A claim for descendant’s benefits came before the district court in Burns v. Astrue. 435 The
parties stipulated to certification of whether an agreement to be a sperm donor constituted
a record of consent to being a parent for purposes of intestacy, entitling the child to social
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security survivor’s benefits. After the Utah Supreme Court opinion 436 declaring that the
donation agreement did not constitute consent to being a parent, the parties stipulated to
dismiss the federal case.
In Whitney v. Division of Juvenile Justice Services 437 the Tenth Circuit (in an
interlocutory appeal) determined that a district judge’s decision denying governmental
immunity was correct—after the Circuit received an answer from the Utah Supreme
Court 438 to the question certified from the Circuit. The case settled shortly after remand.
In Thayer v. Washington County School District 439 settlement was reached after the Utah
supreme Court’s determined 440 that governmental immunity did not bar suit for death of a
student by a firearm used in a school play rehearsal.
The statutory interpretations provided by the Utah Supreme Court 441 to a question
certified by two bankruptcy judges together in In re Kunz 442 and In re Rockwell 443
enabled settlement by clarifying status of funds transferred between two IRA accounts.
After the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion issued, 444 both parties in Iverson v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance Company 445 moved for summary judgment, and filed settlement papers
five months later.
Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 446 settled after the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion 447 defining
the parameters of a public policy which could be the basis of a claim for wrongful
termination of employment. Wal-Mart provoked the settlement by filing a motion for
summary judgment.
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After the opinion from the Utah Supreme Court 448 in Grundberg v. Upjohn Company, 449
District Judge Thomas Greene invited the parties to brief the impact of the ruling and the
case settled three months later.
The role of the answer of the Utah Supreme Court 450 is not as clear in Peterson v.
Browning 451 because the case settled a year and a half after the appellate opinion and
records are not available.
Certification Answer Dispositive for Motion in Federal Case
In two federal district cases, the answer to the certified question was dispositive for a
federal court motion.
Just two days after the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion 452 in Lancer Insurance Co. v. Lake
Shore Motor Coach Lines, 453 District Judge Jill Parrish granted one previously pending
motion for summary judgment and denied the other party’s motion.
In Clark v. United States 454 the answer of the Utah Supreme Court 455 spawned a motion
to dismiss based on governmental immunity. The motion was granted six months after the
certified question was answered.
Certified Answer Irrelevant
In at least one case, a certified question turned out to be irrelevant to the case outcome. In
Waddoups v. Noorda 456 the question was whether a statute barring claims for negligent
credentialing of physicians was retroactive. But two weeks after the Utah Supreme Court
opinion, 457 the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the claim 458 after determining it had no factual basis.
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Deference for Answers to Certified Questions
Utah’s federal trial courts seem to have had no question about applying the answer to
certified questions, but have not expressly considered the possibility of acting otherwise. When
the Utah Supreme Court has responded to a certified question, the Tenth Circuit gives full
deference;
[T]he Utah Supreme Court issued a clear statement of the applicable law in Utah.
Whether we would answer the question differently is immaterial. The Utah Supreme
Court has spoken, and on this issue of state law, we are in no position to question the
propriety of that distinguished court's decision. 459
This regard for the decision of the state court is in marked contrast to “one Ohio federal district
court, [which] having received a divided opinion from the Ohio Supreme Court, chose to dismiss
the disputed state law claim without prejudice, anticipating that the Court could change its mind
in the future.” 460

Utah Supreme Court Responses to Certification Orders
Utah Supreme Court Standards When Responding to Certified Questions
The Utah Supreme Court has substantial control over the certification process. While its
rule authorizes certification, the Court retains the right to “enter an order either accepting or
rejecting the question certified to it.” 461
The Court has rejected questions at the outset, without comment. 462 And it has rejected
questions it has previously accepted, with explanatory commentary;
While it is clear that we have original jurisdiction to answer the certified question,
there does appear to be significant uncertainty as to whether the federal district
court has jurisdiction over these claims. Accordingly, we revoke our acceptance of
the certified question as improvident. 463
In that instance of revocation, the Court added some advice, even though the certification was
revoked:
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While we do not decide whether the federal district court has jurisdiction over the
Plaintiff’s UADA claims, we note that Ms. Endow faces serious jurisdictional
problems as to these claims, problems that were not brought to the attention of the
federal district court in the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The court therefore had
no opportunity to consider them. First, the commencement of the Plaintiff's
federal law claims may bar the continuation of her UADA claims under the plain
language of the Act. Further, she may have failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies under the UADA with respect to the individual defendants. Because of
these serious jurisdictional concerns, any opinion we issue on the certified
question may be advisory, and we do not issue advisory opinions. 464

The Court further elaborated in a footnote to draw the line between observing, advising and
deciding:
We underscore that we do not decide whether the federal district court has
jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s UADA claims. We were not presented with full
briefing or a full record concerning these issues. For instance, while it does not
appear that the Plaintiff filed an administrative claim against the individual
defendants, we were only given one of the many documents relating to her
administrative claim. 465
The federal district court eventually dismissed the UADA claims. 466
The Utah Supreme Court reformulated questions or gave partial answers to certified
questions in three cases. In In re West Side Properties, 467 one of two questions was reformulated
(after a lengthy discussion of the certification process) because as it was submitted, “there is no
unclear issue of state law for us to address, and therefore, the exercise of certification would be
futile.” 468
One of three certified questions was not accepted in TruGreen Companies v. Bitton 469 The
questions certified were:
1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is entitled to an award of lost
profits damages, or instead an award of restitution or unjust enrichment damages,
where a former employee has breached contractual non-competition, nondisclosure, and employee nonsolicitation provisions?
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2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for
tortious interference with a competitor’s contractual and economic relations?
3. Whether “actual damages” under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(1)(b)(i), the
Utah Unfair Competition Act, means the plaintiff’s lost profits or an award of
damages defined by the defendant’s revenues? 470
Without comment, the court accepted only the first two of the questions. 471
The recent opinion in Zimmerman v. University of Utah 472 declined to answer two
accepted questions and made clear that the Utah Supreme Court’s power to accept or reject did
not end at an initial acceptance order:
The power to elect to decide a certified question encompasses the power to
decline to resolve it conclusively in appropriate circumstances. And on reflection
we see reasons not to render a conclusive answer to the first two questions
certified in this case. Because these questions are not adequately briefed by the
parties we decline to resolve them here. Instead we answer only the third
question, which is squarely presented and amply addressed in the parties’
briefs. 473
In nine paragraphs the Court discussed how the inadequacies of the briefing made answers illadvised. 474 “The answer to these questions may yet prove crucial to the disposition of this case.
But the parties have not given us the kind of adversary briefing that we would need to resolve
these important issues with confidence, and we therefore decline to do so.” 475
After the hurdle of acceptance is passed, the Utah Supreme Court has defined standards
for proceeding.
First, the Court will not revisit facts stated in the certification order from the District
Court. When one party “attempted to reargue the facts as found by the federal district court,” the
Court declared that “[i]n answering a question on certification from the district court, we do not
refind the facts; we simply answer the certified question of law.” 476 This restraint is well suited to
the role of the Utah Supreme Court as an arbiter of law and not a court of evidentiary
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presentation. The prohibition against refinding facts prevents unnecessary distractions from the
legal issues presented for decision, and retains respect for the role of the certifying court.
Second, the Court has also stated that it accepts the decision of the federal court as to the
dispositive nature of the certified question. “[T]hose courts’ conclusion that these statutes could
be dispositive is a legal conclusion that we are not in a position to review on certification and
must accept for purposes of answering the certified question.” 477
Third, a certified question presents a unique procedural setting for application of legal
standards. The Court has said:
“A certified question from the federal district court does not present us with a
decision to affirm or reverse a lower court's decision; as such, traditional
standards of review do not apply.” Accordingly, we merely answer the question
presented, leaving “resolution of the parties' competing claims and
arguments . . . up to the federal courts, which of course retain jurisdiction to
decide [the] case.” 478
Fourth, the Court may answer a question broadly. In Egbert v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 479
a party argued that an issue raised by the other party “exceeds the scope of the certified question
and thus we should only look to the narrow question [certified].” 480
This court has noted that it “will reformulate the question if necessary regardless
of whether the federal court has expressly stated this in the certification.”
Therefore, even if the question were limited to the narrow reading proposed . . . ,
we would reformulate the question . . . in order for our answer of the certified
question to clarify the disputed issue of law and to assist the federal district
court. 481
This approach is similar to the “speaking rejection” used to advise the federal court in Endow v.
Utah Transit Authority 482
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court does not attempt to impose its views on the certifying
federal court.
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[E]xcept to clarify our law, we do not pretend to possess or exercise the authority
to dictate the preclusive effect of our decision to the courts of a separate
sovereign. Those courts retain the independent authority to decide whether and to
what extent to apply our law or to recognize limitations on or caveats to it.” 483

Is Certification Worth It?
The last 30 years of certification practice have demonstrated its value, and exposed its
weaknesses. One’s opinion on the value of certification depends on the point of view. If
certification is examined only from the point of view of an individual case, the deficiencies in
certification—time and expense, and uncertainty about both while the parties are in the process
and the federal court is waiting—raise serious questions. When a systemic view is taken,
considering certification in the American federalist structure, the value of certification is more
apparent. But certification involves real cases, so the problems for those cases and benefits to our
federal-state system must both be regarded.

Costs and Benefits for the Parties
In most cases which pass through the certification process, the parties benefit by an
authoritative declaration of Utah law. Many cases demonstrate that the answer resolves the case
or important issues in it. But other cases in which certification is raised also benefit. Discussion
of certification focuses the parties and may resolve issues. Motions to certify questions often
resolve a case. So, the process has value to parties in a practical sense.
But what is the value of a decision by the Utah Supreme Court compared to a decision by
the federal court? A decision by the federal court on an issue of state law is not authoritative and
is subject to question—and to appeal to the Tenth Circuit, if the decision is made by a trial court
judge, and even possible certification by the Tenth Circuit—whereas a decision by the Utah
Supreme Court terminates debate on the issue. 484 So, the parties not only benefit by the answer
but by the finality of the answer to a certified question. And there is clearly enhanced benefit to
having a decision thought through by a team of judges rather than by one federal trial judge.
But certification also costs the parties. Years may elapse between the suggestion of
certification and the eventual answer from the Utah Supreme Court. Some of this delay can be
attributable to the undefined process for certifying questions in federal court. It has taken over a
year, in some instances, for the federal trial court to certify a question. The cost of briefing and
argument may, due to formalities in the Utah Supreme Court briefing process, be greater than the
same briefing and argument in the federal court, if the federal court were to decide the question.
The time to decide an issue in the Utah Supreme Court is usually longer than the time required
for such a decision in a federal trial court. The Utah Supreme Court treats certification as a
standard appeal, with a time frame which may be as long as the entire complaint-to-trial process
in federal court. The decision of the Utah Supreme Court may be slower than a federal trial court
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decision because the Utah Supreme Court is better equipped—and accustomed—to consider
broader issues, including state law context, implications for other areas of the law, and state
policy, than a federal trial court might consider. Decisions also take longer in the Utah Supreme
Court because five judges must make a decision—or decisions, in the case of concurrences and
dissents—while in the trial court, one judge makes the decision.
If an issue is legitimately subject to certification, efficiency for the parties dictates that
certification occur in the trial court. Certification often terminates or narrows a case in the trial
court, and may prevent appeals to the Tenth Circuit. A party aggrieved by a failure to certify an
issue will harbor the hope that the Tenth Circuit will certify, and is motivated to appeal. An
answer by the Utah Supreme Court to the trial court removes that hope and likely resolves, at
least partially, the case, preventing a federal appeal. As is the case in most litigation, an early
decision benefits the parties’ need for resolution.
The parties will expend more time and perhaps more money in receiving an answer to a
certified question from the Utah Supreme Court. But they receive an authoritative answer, from a
system designed to render a decision, formulated through debate among the justices, that is not
subject to appeal. The value of a Utah Supreme Court decision on an issue of state law is much
greater than the decision of a federal trial court. The facts of a specific case will, however, dictate
whether certification is advisable in that case, based on the benefits to the parties.

Costs and Benefits for the Federal and State Systems
The value of the certification process and the value of certification in a specific case must
also consider the value of certification to the federal and state judicial systems. The Utah
Supreme Court is the constitutionally designated authority for decisions on Utah state law.
Federal courts are authorized and required to apply state law but they do not have the assignment
to declare state law. State and federal authority are always debated, but the constitutional roles of
these separate courts are respected and acknowledged by certification of questions.
Old precedent, from a time when certification was unavailable or novel, sometimes
referred to the abilities and resources of federal trial courts, implying that they were as well
suited to define state law as a state appellate court. Use of this aged guidance in the present time
when certification is readily available can appear to demonstrate a lack of humility and lack of
respect by the federal trial court. The federal courts have limited jurisdiction and while applying
state law is necessary for federal courts, the boundary between applying and declaring needs to
be observed. The federal court may do its best, but get the answer wrong, with terrible
consequences for the case before the court and for future cases. 485 By assignment and
constitutional role, the federal court cannot speak with authority on state law.
The five justices of the Utah Supreme Court are authoritative specialists in Utah state law
and the Utah constitution. The Utah Supreme Court is able to concentrate on the issue(s)
certified, with more focused briefing than that which might occur in a state appeal. Undistracted
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by a multitude of issues after trial, the justices are able to turn full attention to the legal issue(s),
on a clear and simply summarized factual and procedural record. 486
Federal court recognition of the value of the answer to a certified question is a
demonstration of comity between the courts of different sovereigns. Certification is a clear
statement of support for the federal-state division of authority, which not only benefits the state
but also benefits the federal system. Our branches of government need more opportunity to
demonstrate the mutual respect that is shown by certification of questions.
Even if a question is rejected or reformulated, the federal court which issues a
certification order has reflected the respect due the Utah Supreme Court. If the Utah Supreme
Court feels an issue is clear—or that a forthcoming opinion in an appeal will answer the
question—it is able to so state in rejecting a certified question.

Summary and Reconciliation of Costs and Benefits
When evaluating certification in a specific case, the parties and court must consider the
values of the judicial system, in addition to the demands of their case. The existence of a novel
question of law, unsettled by state authority, likely to bear in other cases, requires the court and
parties to look beyond their current dispute. This is an opportunity for counsel and the court to
look at the larger purposes of the judicial system and the respective roles of federal and state
courts. Comity and federalism are much larger than any current case and future cases. So, those
factors external to the case may drive a case to bear a burden for the benefit of others. The parties
are, unless one of them is a recurrent litigant or a governmental entity, most likely to emphasize
case specific factors. The court must require the parties to address factors external to the case and
may need to develop those factors itself if the parties do not adequately address them. Focus on
these multiple considerations is challenging but will ensure that certification is wisely employed.

Recommendations for Improvement of the Utah Certification Process
The process of certification to the Utah Supreme Court can be improved based on the
experience of the last 30 years. The wide variations in the federal trial court
•
•
•

in suggesting certification by motion or sua sponte;
in time taken to promulgate a certification order after certification is suggested;
and
in the process of generating the certification order

can all be standardized through a local federal court rule on certification. Defining the current ad
hoc certification process in the federal trial court would likely save time and money, and
introduce clarity for the parties and for judges.
The process in the Utah Supreme Court may also be clarified and accelerated.
Improvements might include statement of a reason for rejection of a certified question, including
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express reference to a case pending before the Court in which the question will likely be
answered; reduction of timeframes for delivery of the record, briefing; and issuance of
opinion(s); and introduction of a process for revision of deficient certification orders.
Reducing the time to receive an answer to a certified question would be the single
greatest benefit to the parties in a case with a certified question, and to the federal court in which
the case is pending.

Changes in Federal Practice
In contrast to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has a rule on certification of
questions, and the more comprehensive rule of the Utah Supreme Court, certification practice in
the District of Utah is less defined, arising ad hoc in each case. A rule is likely the best way to
formalize the practice, to raise awareness of the availability of certification, and to reduce sua
sponte certification on appeal—and perhaps reduce appeals.

Recommendation of a Local Federal Rule
Because a federal court may certify questions to any other court capable of receiving the
question, a local federal court rule must be broadly drawn. But such a rule will draw on the
experience deepest experience of the court—which for the Utah federal district court is with the
Utah Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit has a rule on certification 487 which is quite complete
compared to the rule in the Second Circuit. 488 But neither are as complete as needed for a local
rule in the District of Utah. The text of a proposed rule follows uninterrupted with a later
explanation of the sources and rationale for the rule components.
DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of Law
By certification of questions of law, the district court federal court respects the role of
other tribunals, agencies, and courts. Answers to certified questions are authoritative,
issued by the institution entrusted with the responsibility of interpretation. The
relationships of federal and state governments are properly respected by certification of
questions of law to a state court.
(a) Certification of Questions of Law

487

10th Cir. R. 27.2.

488

Certification of Questions of State Law:
(a) General Rule. If state law permits, the court may certify a question of state law to that state's
highest court. When the court certifies a question, the court retains jurisdiction pending the state
court's response to the certified question.
(b) Motion or Request. A party may move to certify a question of state law by filing a separate
motion or by including a request for certification in its brief.
2d Cir. R. 27.2.
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When the law or rule of another jurisdiction, agency, tribunal, or court permits, this court
may certify a question arising under the law of that jurisdiction to the appropriate agency,
tribunal, or court as designated and under the procedures in that law or rule, if: 489
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be decided under the law of the
other jurisdiction;
(2) the answer to the question may be determinative of an issue in the pending
litigation; and
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not provided by a controlling
appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction. 490
(b) Motion or Suggestion for Certification
A party should move to certify the question of law at the earliest opportunity. Or the court
may suggest certification of the question. Any motion or response to a suggestion by the
court should discuss:
(1) the question and its role in the case as determinative of an issue;
(2) the relationship of that question to the case as a whole and the effect of
certification on other procedures in the case such as discovery and motions;
(3) available authority on the question from appellate decisions, constitutional
provisions, or statutes of the other jurisdiction;
(4) available guidance on the question from decisions of other sources;
(5) the facts which are relevant to the determination of the question and which
show the nature of the controversy and the context in which the question arises; 491
(6) the anticipated time and expense of receiving an answer to the question;
(7) the benefits of an authoritative decision to other litigation or disputes in this or
other courts, tribunals, or agencies;
(8) the relationship of the issue to the policy of the other jurisdiction;
(9) how comity and federalism will be affected by a decision to certify or not
certify; and

489

Broadened from Tenth Circuit rule. 10th Cir. R. 27.2.

490

Uniform Act (1995) § 2.

491

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).
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(10) other matters material to the decision to certify or not to certify.
(c) When the court suggests certification or when a motion is filed, the court shall set a
hearing to be held within 28 days.
(d) Any response to the motion or suggestion shall be filed within 14 days.
(e) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a question shall be certified, the court shall
expressly state which, if any, activities in the case shall abate pending the decision on the
certified question.
(f) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a question shall be certified, the parties
shall meet, confer and within 7 days of the hearing propose an Order Certifying Question
which shall clearly state, with adequate discussion and support:
(1) the question of law to be answered; 492
(2) that the question certified is a controlling issue of law in the proceeding 493 and
why the answer to the question will materially advance the termination of the
litigation;
(3) that there appears to be no controlling Utah law; 494
(4) that the agency, tribunal, or court receiving the question may reformulate the
question; 495
(5) all facts which are relevant to the determination of the question certified and
which show the nature of the controversy, the context in which the question arose,
and the procedural steps by which the question was framed;
(5) any additional reasons for its entry of the certification order that are not
otherwise apparent; 496
(6) a listing of the record documents which the parties believe should be sent to
court, agency or tribunal, receiving the certified question;

492

Id. 41(c)(1)(A).

493

Id. 41(c)(1)(B).

494

Id. 41(c)(1)(C).

495

Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(3).

496

Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(3).
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(7) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without
counsel; 497
(8) such other matters as may be appropriate.
(g) This rule shall be construed broadly to permit and enable timely certification of
questions.
(h) The answer to the certified question shall be considered binding on that issue. 498
The following table lists the components of the proposed local rule with explanation as to
the source and function.
DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of
Law

Explanation

By certification of questions of law, the district
court federal court respects the role of other
tribunals, agencies, and courts. Answers to
certified questions are authoritative, issued by the
institution entrusted with the responsibility of
interpretation. The relationships of federal and
state governments are properly respected by
certification of questions of law to a state court.

This statement of purpose places the
policy reasons for certification in front of
the parties, who are more concerned about
the practical effects on their own case.
The rule’s provisions require the court to
consider both.

(a) Certification of Questions of Law

This subparagraph is drawn from the
Tenth Circuit rule, but broadened to
match language in the Uniform Act
(1995) § 1 to include all possible entities
to which certification might be made.

When the law or rule of another jurisdiction,
agency, tribunal or court permits, this court may
certify a question arising under the law of that
jurisdiction to the appropriate agency, tribunal or
court as designated and under the procedures in
that law or rule, if:

497

Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4).

498

Burkholz, 211 F.3d 1277 (Table), at *3.
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DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of
Law

Explanation

(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be These subparagraphs are drawn from the
decided under the law of the other jurisdiction;
Uniform Act (1995) § 2.
(2) the answer to the question may be
determinative of an issue in the pending litigation;
and
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not
provided by a controlling appellate decision,
constitutional provision, or statute of the other
jurisdiction.
(b) Motion or Suggestion for Certification
A party should move to certify the question of law
at the earliest opportunity. Or the court may
suggest certification of the question. Any motion
or response to a suggestion by the court should
discuss

This subparagraph is drawn to meet the
requirements of Utah R. App. P. 41.
It adds many considerations for the
district court which may not be as
relevant to the entity receiving the
certified question.

(1) the question and its role in the case as
determinative of an issue;
(2) the relationship of that issue to the case as a
whole and the effect of certification on other
procedures in the case such as discovery and
motions;
(3) available authority on the issue from appellate
decisions, constitutional provisions, or statutes of
the other jurisdiction;
(4) available guidance from decisions of other
courts on the question;
(5) the facts which are relevant to the
determination of the question and which show the Subparagraph (5) includes language from
nature of the controversy and the context in which Utah R. App. P 41(c)(2).
the question arises;
(6) the anticipated time and expense of receiving
an answer to the question;
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DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of
Law

Explanation

(7) the benefits of an authoritative decision to
other litigation or disputes in this or other courts,
tribunals or agencies;
(8) the relationship of the issue to the policy of
the other jurisdiction;
(9) how comity and federalism will be affected by
a decision to certify or not certify; and
(10) other matters material to the decision to
certify or not to certify.
(c) When the court suggests certification or when
a motion is filed, the court shall set a hearing to
be held within 28 days.

Setting a hearing at the earliest date will
reduce time in the certification process.

(d) Any response to the motion or suggestion shall Defining response time for sua sponte
be filed within 14 days.
suggestions of certification is new but
otherwise this subparagraph conforms to
DUCivR 7-1(b)(3)(B).
(e) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a
question shall be certified, the court shall
expressly state which, if any, activities in the case
shall abate pending the decision on the certified
question.

Requiring the court and parties to
consider the effect of certification on the
case schedule will cause the realities of
that effect to be carefully considered.

(f) If, at the hearing, the court determines that a
question shall be certified, the parties shall meet,
confer and within 7 days of the hearing propose
an Order Certifying Question which shall clearly
state, with adequate discussion and support:

The requirement that the parties meet and
confer takes the advice offered in In re
West Side Property Associates 499 that
attorney input creates better certification
orders.

499

13 P.3d at 170-71.
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DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of
Law

Explanation

(1) the question of law to be answered;

These subparagraphs are drawn from
Utah R. App. P 41(c)(1) but modified
consistent with Uniform Act (1995) § 3,
to refer to questions “determinative of an
issue” rather than “controlling issues of
law.” The additional requirement that the
answer materially advance the
termination of the litigation places the
issue in context of the entire case.

(2) that the question certified may be
determinative of an issue in the proceeding and
why the answer to the question will materially
advance the termination of the litigation;
(3) that there appears to be no controlling Utah
law;

(4) that the agency, tribunal, or court receiving the This subparagraph is drawn from the
question may reformulate the question;
Uniform Act (1995) § (6)(a)(3).
(5) all facts which are relevant to the
From Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).
determination of the question certified and which
show the nature of the controversy, the context in
which the question arose, and the procedural steps
by which the question was framed;
(5) any additional reasons for its entry of the
certification order that are not otherwise apparent;

From Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(2).

(6) a listing of the record documents which the
parties believe should be sent to court, agency or
tribunal receiving the certified question;

This subparagraph anticipates (and may
accelerate) transmission of the record
under Utah R. App. P. 41(d).

(7) the names and addresses of counsel of record
and parties appearing without counsel; and

From Uniform Act (1995) § 6(a)(4).

(8) such other matters as may be appropriate.
(e) Within 28 days of the motion or suggestion,
the court shall set a hearing or issue an Order
Certifying Question.

This subparagraph sets a sense of urgency
in certification.

(f) If an Order Certifying Question issues, the
court shall expressly state in a separate order
which, if any activities in the case shall abate
pending the decision on the certified question.

This provision requires that the status of
the pending case be expressly treated.

(g) This rule shall be construed broadly to permit
and enable timely certification of questions.
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DUCivR __ - __ Certification of Questions of
Law

Explanation

(h) The answer to the certified question shall be
considered binding on that issue.

Consistent with Burkholz v. Joyce, 500 this
provision encourages due regard for an
answer to a certified question, which is
received at personal and institutional
costs.

Changes in State Rule and Practice
Some potential changes in state practice and the state rule have been noted above.
Reformulation of questions was implemented by decision in Utah, 501 while the Uniform Act
(1995) includes it in rule text. 502 Rejection orders might state reasons for rejection to guide future
practitioners, and if the reason for rejection is a pending appeal dealing with the issue, that other
case might be identified. And time frames might be defined.
The following table shows recommended revisions in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
41. The variations from the Uniform Act (1995) are noted..
RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS

Explanation

(a) Authorization to answer questions of law. The
Utah Supreme Court may answer a question of
Utah law certified to it by a court of the United
States when requested to do so by such certifying
court acting in accordance with the provisions of
this rule if the state of the law of Utah applicable to
a proceeding before the certifying court is
uncertain.

The limitations of Utah Const. Art. VIII,
Sec. 3 prohibit broadening
subparagraphs (a) and (b) to match the
Uniform Act (1995) § 3 to add “by [an
appellate [the highest] court of another
State [or of a tribe ] [or of Canada, a
Canadian province or territory, Mexico,
or a Mexican state]

(b) Procedure to invoke. Any court of the United
States may invoke this rule by entering an order of
certification as described in this rule. When
invoking this rule, the certifying court may act
either sua sponte or upon a motion by any party.

500

211 F.3d 1277 (Table), at *3.

501

In re W. Side Prop. Assocs., 13 P.3d 168.

502

Uniform Act (1995) § 4.
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RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS

Explanation

(c) Certification order.

Subparagraph (c) reflects the odd
function of a certification rule in a
receiving court, defining the order to
issue from a certifying court. It may be
that a conference between rules
committees of the Utah Supreme Court
and District of Utah can correlate
expectations and deliveries and
consistency of rules in each court.

(c)(1) A certification order shall be directed to the
Utah Supreme Court and shall state:
(c)(1)(A) the question of law to be answered;
(c)(1)(B) that the question certified is a controlling
issue of law may be determinative of an issue in a
the proceeding pending before the certifying court
and that the answer to the question will materially
advance the termination of that proceeding; and
(c)(1)(C) that there appears to be no controlling
Utah law.; and

Compare the proposal for a local federal
rule, subparagraph (d)(2), derived from
Utah R. App. P. 41(c)(1)(B) but
modified consistent with Uniform Act
(1995) § 3.

(c)(1)(C) that this Court may reformulate a question From Uniform Act (1995) § 4. Adding
of law certified to it.
this subparagraph makes clear the
holding of In re West Side Property
Associates. 503
(c)(2) The order shall also set forth all facts which
are relevant to the determination of the question
certified and which show the nature of the
controversy, the context in which the question
arose, and the procedural steps by which the
question was framed including opportunities for the
parties to meet, confer and contribute to the content
of the certification order.

The new text reflects the assumption in
Uniform Act (1995) § 6(b) that the
parties will contribute to the
certification order. In re West Side
Property Associates observed that when
“courts prepare the questions themselves
without input from counsel . . . the
wrong questions [may be] asked.” 504

(c)(3) The certifying court may also include in the
order any additional reasons for its entry of the
certification order that are not otherwise apparent.
(d) Form of certification order; submission of
record. A certification order shall be signed by the
judge presiding over the proceeding giving rise to
the certification order and forwarded to the Utah
Supreme Court by the clerk of the certifying court
under its official seal. The Supreme Court may
503

13 P.3d 168.

504

Id. at 170.

Record transmission should be
accelerated by the new federal rule
subparagraph (d)(6).
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RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS

Explanation

require that all or any portion of the record before
the certifying court be filed with the Supreme Court
if the record or a portion thereof may be necessary
in determining whether to accept the certified
question or in answering that question. A copy of
the record certified by the clerk of the certifying
court to conform to the original may be substituted
for the original as the record.
(e) Acceptance, reformulation or rejection of
certification. Upon filing of the certification order
and accompanying papers with the clerk, the
Supreme Court shall promptly enter an order either
accepting, reformulating or rejecting the question
certified to it, and the clerk shall serve copies of the
order upon the certifying court and all parties
identified in the certification order. If the Supreme
Court accepts the question, the Court will set out in
the order of acceptance (1) the specific question or
questions accepted, (2) the deadline for notifying
the Supreme Court as to those portions of the
record which shall be copied and filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court, and (3) information as
to when the briefing schedule will be established. If
the Supreme Court rejects the question, the Court
may set out in the order of rejection any reasons for
rejection and any pending appeal which already
presents the certified question.

The specific reference to reformulation
puts parties on notice of that possibility.
The suggestion that a rejection order
may provide information beyond a bare
rejection may allow parties to be
informed as to better practice or the
possibility that a question may be
answered by an appellate case in
process. A rejection order that comments
on the basis for rejection may assist the
federal court in reframing a deficient
certification order.

(f) Briefing; oral argument. The form of briefs
The new language is drawn in part from
and proceedings on oral argument will be governed the proposed local federal rule (b) and
by these rules except as such rules may be modified Uniform Act (1995) § 7.
by the Supreme Court to accommodate the
differences between the appeal process and the
determination of a certified question and the
schedule of proceeding giving rise to the
certification order and the implications of delay on
the proceeding. The clerk of the Supreme Court
will provide written notice to the parties as to the
schedule for the filing of briefs and content
requirements, as well as the schedule and
procedures for oral argument. In recognition of the
narrowness of the issue(s) presented and the
defined record, in accordance with notions of
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RULE 41. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS
OF LAW BY UNITED STATES COURTS

Explanation

comity and fairness, the Supreme Court will
respond to an accepted or reformulated certified
question as soon as practicable.
(g) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. Upon
acceptance by the Supreme Court of the question of
law presented by the certification order, counsel for
the parties not licensed to practice law in the state
of Utah may appear pro hac vice upon motion filed
pursuant to the Code of Judicial Administration.

This subparagraph might be better
placed as a separate Rule of Appellate
Procedure.

These refinements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may contribute to more
clarity in the certification process.

Conclusions
Certification has been successfully implemented in Utah. Though the first effort in 1975
was unsuccessful, a constitutional amendment in 1984 made possible certification of legal
questions to the Utah Supreme Court. The experience of the last 30 years confirms the value of
certification. Some of the most interesting and important issues in state law are resolved in the
answers to certified questions. 505
Certification confirms the relative roles of the state and federal courts, and helps resolve
cases. Answers to certified questions are authoritative, issued by the court with constitutional
responsibility to interpret state law. Those answers put to rest hopes of obtaining a different
answer from a different federal judge at the trial or appellate level.
The rate of certification and the rate of acceptance of certified questions by the Utah
Supreme Court suggests the utility of the process and that relationships of the federal courts and
the Utah Supreme Court are good. The transition of former Justice Jill Parrish to the federal
district bench has increased the use of certification.
With changes, the process can be improved to reduce burdens in individual cases, by
more clearly defining processes and time frames in the federal court and clarifying the state
appellate rule. This thesis proposes a new rule for the federal district court, and changes to the
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure.

505

See Appendix listing certified questions.

80

Beyond the rule proposals, defining and reducing timeframes in the Utah Supreme Court
would also reduce burdens on individual cases. As was demonstrated in Grundberg (5 months) 506
and Utah Republican Party (4 months), 507 the certification process can be completed in a very
short time. Not every case needs such accelerated treatment, but if a defined timeframe were
available, the relative burden on parties would decrease, allowing more certifications to occur,
thus recognizing more often the rightful place of the Utah Supreme Court in declaring Utah law.
Increased awareness of the process and definition of criteria for its use will likely
increase wise use of certification, and contribute to the achievements already made by the federal
courts and by the Utah Supreme Court, for the benefit of citizens, litigants and counsel.

506

Supra, at 30 n.202-06.

507

Supra, at 50-51 n.333-341.
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Appendices
Appendix - Recommendations for Further Study
In the somewhat unstudied area of certification of questions to the Utah Supreme Court,
numerous byways for further study were encountered. Some of these were within the original
scope of the thesis but deferred due to the time available for the thesis.
More detailed study within the scope of the thesis
Several projects could be undertaken within the scope of this thesis which confines itself
to the cases involved with certification of questions to the Utah Supreme Court.
What were the origins of the 1975 Certification Rule?
How do counsel and parties involved in certification evaluate the process and its effect on
time and expense in a case?
How do judges and justices evaluate certification processes and the substantive impact of
certification on the case at hand and (in the Utah Supreme Court) on other appellate
caseload?
Would informal discussions, outside the context of any specific case, between judges of
federal courts and justices of the Utah Supreme Court cause improvements in the
certification process?
Would an interactive process between the Utah Supreme Court and the federal court help
improve the quality of certification orders and answers to certified questions?
How do the internal procedures of the Utah Supreme Court differ for interlocutory
appeals and answering certified questions? Are the internal standards and processes for
evaluation, acceptance and rejection the same or different? Are the time frames for
processing these cases similar or different? In both instances, the trial court awaits a
decision to move forward with resolution of a pending case, as contrasted with an appeal
in which the parties have reached decision on most issues before the Utah Supreme Court
considers the case.
Did the federal court in Miller v. United States properly analyze the Federal Tort Claims
Act issue after the Utah Supreme Court ruled? When a federal tort case is dependent on
state common law is the state court decision final as was suggested in Miller or does the
federal court have the ability to find a limited claim present as was done in Smith v.
Pena?
Would a comprehensive review of all certification orders from the trial courts and Tenth
Circuit reveal best practices for such orders?
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Tenth Circuit involvement in certification
The brief look at the practices of the Tenth Circuit in certification of questions to Utah
has suggested many areas for future study.
Which judges on the Tenth Circuit have been the most active in certification?
Does the Tenth Circuit deny all motions for certification in all its cases or just in those
involving Utah?
How does the Tenth Circuit rate of sua sponte certification to the Utah Supreme Court
compare to the Tenth Circuit rate of sua sponte certification to other courts?
In nine of the cases in which questions were certified sua sponte by the Tenth Circuit to
the Utah Supreme Court, the answer resulted in reversal of the district court’s opinion. In
four instances, the Supreme Court’s answer did not change the ruling below. How was
the Tenth Circuit so well able to target cases for certification which affected the trial court
result?
Study of inter-institutional dynamics of certification
If certification procedures originate in the legislature are they more or less used than
procedures originating in the courts?
How is acceptance of certified questions affected by other relationships of state courts
and federal counterparts?
How does certification compare with the EU Preliminary Ruling Process?
Other Topics
Study of certification practices in other states would yield helpful comparative
information.
Review of opinions written on the subject of certification by Judge Guido Calabresi of
the Second Circuit, an advocate of certification, would provide guidance from a judge
who is possibly the most published on the subject.
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Appendix—Uniform Acts
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act 1967
§ 1. [Power to Answer].
The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court
of Appeals of the United States, a United States District Court, the United States Court of International Trade, the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, the United States Claims Court, the United States Court of Military Appeals,
the United States Tax Court, [or the highest appellate court or the intermediate appellate court of any other state],
when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state
which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying
court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and the intermediate appellate courts]
of this state.
§ 2. [Method of Invoking].
This [Act] [Rule] may be invoked by an order of any of the courts referred to in section 1 upon the court’s own motion
or upon the motion of any party to the cause.
§ 3. [Contents of Certification Order].
A certification order shall set forth
(1) the questions of law to be answered; and
(2) a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which
the questions arose.
§ 4. [Preparation of Certification Order].
The certification order shall be prepared by the certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at the hearing, and
forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the clerk of the certifying court under its official seal. The [Supreme Court] may
require the original or copies of all or of any portion of the record before the certifying court to be filed with the
certification order, if, in the opinion of the [Supreme Court], the record or portion thereof may be necessary in
answering the questions.
§ 5. [Costs of Certification].
Fees and costs shall be the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] and shall be equally divided
between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification.
§ 6. [Briefs and Argument].
Proceedings in the [Supreme Court] shall be those provided in [local rules or statutes governing briefs and arguments].
§ 7. [Opinion].
The written opinion of the [Supreme Court] stating the law governing the questions certified shall be sent by the clerk
under the seal of the Supreme Court to the certifying court and to the parties.
§ 8. [Power to Certify].
The [Supreme Court] [or the intermediate appellate courts] of this state, on [its] [their] own motion or the motion of
any party, may order certification of questions of law to the highest court of any state when it appears to the certifying
court that there are involved in any proceeding before the court questions of law of the receiving state which may be
determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and it appears to the certifying court that there are no
controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court or intermediate appellate courts of the receiving state.]
§ 9. [Procedure on Certifying].
The procedures for certification from this state to the receiving state shall be those provided in the laws of the receiving
state.]
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§ 10. [Severability].
If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or the application thereof to any person, court, or circumstance is held invalid,
the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the [Act] [Rule] which can be given effect without
the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable
§ 11. [Construction].
This [Act] [Rule] shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
§ 12. [Short Title].
This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule].
§ 13. [Time of Taking Effect].
This [Act] [Rule] shall take effect __________.

Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (1995)
§ 1. Definitions[s].
In this [Act] [Rule]:
(1) “State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
[(2) “Tribe” means a tribe, band, or village of native Americans which is recognized by federal law or formally
acknowledged by a State.]
§ 2. Power to Certify.
The [Supreme Court] [or an intermediate appellate court] of this State, on the motion of a party to pending litigation
or its own motion, may certify a question of law to the highest court of another State [or of a tribe] [or of Canada, a
Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state] if:
(1) the pending litigation involves a question to be decided under the law of the other jurisdiction;
(2) the answer to the question may be determinative of an issue in the pending litigation; and
(3) the question is one for which an answer is not provided by a controlling appellate decision, constitutional
provision, or statute of the other jurisdiction.
§ 3. Power to Answer.
The [Supreme Court] of this State may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States or by
[an appellate] [the highest] court of another State [or of a tribe] [or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory,
Mexico, or a Mexican state], if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying
court and there is no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision, or statute of this State.
§ 4. Power to Reformulate Question.
The [Supreme Court] of this State may reformulate a question of law certified to it.
§ 5. Certification Order; Record.
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The court certifying a question of law to the [Supreme Court] of this State shall issue a certification order and forward
it to the [Supreme Court] of this State. Before responding to a certified question, the [Supreme Court] of this State
may require the certifying court to deliver all or part of its record to the [Supreme Court] of this State.
§ 6. Contents of Certification Order.
(a) A certification order must contain:
(1) the question of law to be answered;
(2) the facts relevant to the question, showing fully the nature of the controversy out of which the question arose;
(3) a statement acknowledging that the [Supreme Court] of this State, acting as the receiving court, may reformulate
the question; and
(4) the names and addresses of counsel of record and parties appearing without counsel.
(b) If the parties cannot agree upon a statement of facts, the certifying court shall determine the relevant facts and state
them as a part of its certification order.
§ 7. Notice; Response.
The [Supreme Court] of this State, acting as a receiving court, shall notify the certifying court of acceptance or
rejection of the question and, in accordance with notions of comity and fairness, respond to an accepted certified
question as soon as practicable.
§ 8. Procedures.
After the [Supreme Court] of this State has accepted a certified question, proceedings are governed by [the rules and
statutes governing briefs, arguments, and other appellate procedures]. Procedures for certification from this State to a
receiving court are those provided in the rules and statutes of the receiving forum.
§ 9. Opinion.
The [Supreme Court] of this State shall state in a written opinion the law answering the certified question and send a
copy of the opinion to the certifying court, counsel of record, and parties appearing without counsel.
§ 10. Cost of Certification.
Fees and costs are the same as in [civil appeals] docketed before the [Supreme Court] of this State and must be equally
divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court.
§ 11. Severability.
If any provision of this [Act] [Rule] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does
not affect other provisions or applications of this [Act] [Rule] which can be given effect without the invalid provision
or application, and to this end the provisions of this [Act] [Rule] are severable.
§ 12. Uniformity of Application and Construction.
This [Act] [Rule] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform law with respect to
the subject of the [Act] [Rule] among States [enacting] [adopting] it.
§ 13. Short Title.
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This [Act] [Rule] may be cited as the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law [Act] [Rule] (1995).
§ 14. Effective Date.
This [Act] [Rule] takes effect on __________.
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Appendix—List of All Cases Considering Certification
All Cer�ﬁca�on Cases - sorted by trial court judge
Case name
Case number

Judge

Dist. Ct.
Cert?
Cir.

DB ID

United States v Stubbs

C 76 67

A. Anderson

No

43

Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty.

2:90-cv-248-BSJ

A. Anderson

Y

67

In re Hendry

2:14-bk-27398-KA

Anderson

Y

156

In re Kiley

2:15-bk-27838-KA

Anderson

Y

157

Pace v. Swerdlow

2:06-cv-00027-DB

Benson

Y

111

CR England v Swi�

2:14-cv-00781 DB

Benson

Y

153

Compressor Pump v. Allis-Chalmers

2:89-cv-00451-DB

Benson

No

134

Land v. EG&G Defense Materials

2:04-cv-00479-DB

Benson

No

40

Kennard v. Leavit

2:01-cv-00171-DB

Benson

Y

123

Carson v. Am. Family Mut. Ins.

2:09-cv-00663-DB

Benson

No

130

Clark v. United States

2:98-cv-00304-DB

Benson

Y

133

Egbert et al v. Nissan North America et

2:04-cv-00551-DN

Benson

Y

142

Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ

2:08-cv-00772-DB

Benson

No

Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

1:06-cv-00113-DB

Benson

Y

Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine

1:05-cv-00088-DB

Benson

No

Y

151

Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp.

2:95-cv-00752-DB

Benson

No

Y

100

Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Aﬀairs

2:12-cv-00968-DB

Benson

Y

59

Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist.

2:09-cv-00565-DB

Benson

Y

32

In re W. Side Prop. Assocs.

97-20887

Boulden

Y

107

SEC v. Merrill Scot, Ltd.

2:02-cv-00039-TC

Campbell

No

53

Society of Lloyd's v. Bennet

2:02-cv-00204-TC

Campbell

No

62

Shipley v. Forest Labs.

1:06-cv-00048-TC

Campbell

No

58

Bower v. Temple Mountain Energy

2:09-cv-01141-TC

Campbell

No

124

Whiteman v. Friel

2:05-cv-00424−TC

Campbell

No

49

Hale v. Fingerhut Co., Inc.

2:95-cv-00660-TC

Campbell

No

89

Utah Life & Disability v. Teacher Ins.

2:00-cv-00530-TS

Campbell

No

45

Pay Less Drug Stores v. Tender II, Ltd.

2:95-cv-00179-TC

Campbell

No

110

W. States Contrac�ng v. Spilsbury

2:10-cv-01141-TC

Campbell

No

16

Morgan v. McCoter

2:99-cv-00073-TC

Campbell

No

149

United Pac. Ins. Co v. Knudsen Constr.

2:97-cv-00235-TC

Campbell

No

44

Adams v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.

2:92-cv-00516-TC

Campbell

No

22

Y

72
109

89

Burkholz v. Joyce

2:96-cv-00252-TC

Campbell

Y

127

Endow v. Utah Transit Auth.

1:13-cv-00108-TC

Campbell

Y

143

Gardner v. Galetka

2:95-cv-00846-TC

Campbell

Y

73

Miller v. United States

1:02-cv-00037-TC

Campbell

Y

85

Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty.

1:98-cv-00120-TC

Campbell

Y

64

Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.

1:04-cv-00067-TC

Campbell

Y

27

Gibbs v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

2:00-cv-00549-PGC

Cassell

Y

77

Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

2:00-cv-00904-PGC

Cassell

Y

56

Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex

1:03-cv-00099-PGC

Cassell

No

TruGreen Cos. v. Biton

1:06-cv-00024-BSJ

Cassell

Y

36

Black v United States

C 138-66

Christensen

No

14

In re Kunz

2:02-bk-40422-GEC

Clark

Y

154

In re Rockwell

2:02-bk-42013-WTT

Thurman

Y

154

Mitchell v. Roberts

2:16-cv-00843-EJF

Furse

Y

147

Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty.

2:13-cv-01122-EJF

Furse

Y

122

Baker v. D&RG

2:94-cv-00017-JTG

Greene

No

30

Bills v. Utah Farm Bur. Ins. Co.

2:91-cv-00193-JTG

Greene

No

119

Jorgensen v. Larsen

2:88-cv-00761-JTG

Greene

No

121

Young v. Delta Airlines

2:99-cv-00859-JTG

Greene

No

18

Albright v. Granite Bd. of Ed.

2:90-cv-00639-JTG

Greene

No

23

Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.

2:89-cv-00543-JTG

Greene

Y

78

Grundbergl v. Upjohn Co.

2:89-cv-00274-JTG

Greene

Y

79

Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.

2:88-cv-00708-JTG

Greene

Y

90

Hirpa v. IHC Hosp., Inc.

1:90-cv-00086-JTG

Greene

No

Peterson v. Browning

1:87-cv-00121-JTG

Greene

Y

105

Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins

2:88-cv-00410-JTG

Greene

Y

66

Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.

2:87-cv-00330-JTG

Greene

Y

70

United W. Bank v. Moyes

2:08-cv-00218-BSJ

Jenkins

No

51

McCourt v. Semken

2:87-cv-01052-BSJ

Jenkins

Y

83

MacArthur v. San Juan Cty.

2:00-cv-00584-BSJ

Jenkins

No

55

Wright v. Deland

2:90-cv-00829-BSJ

Jenkins

No

19

Strawberry Water v. United States

2:01-cv-00295-BSJ

Jenkins

No

69

Jensen v. NSLC

1:93-cv-00134-BSJ

Jenkins

No

115

MacArthur v. San Juan Cty.

2:00-cv-00584-BSJ

Jenkins

No

139

Y

Y

138

92

90

Cyprus Plateau Mining v. Commonwealth 2:96-cv-00401-BSJ

Jenkins

No

136

Copier v. Smith & Wesson

2:95-cv-00723-BSJ

Jenkins

No

135

Cincinna� Ins. Co. v. AMSCO Windows

2:10-cv-00542-BSJ

Jenkins

No

132

Century Indem. v. Hanover Ins.

2:97-cv-00925-BSJ

Jenkins

No

131

Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.

2:93-cv-00042-BSJ

Jenkins

Y

Gladwell v. Reinhart

2:06-cv-00325-BSJ

Jenkins

No

Y

106

Mecham v. Frazier

1:04-cv-00033-CW

Jenkins

No

Y

146

Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed.

2:89-cv-00979-DB

Jenkins

Y

63

Rose v. Utah State Bar

2:10-cv-1001-WPJ

Johnson

No

96

Johnson v. Life Inv’rs Ins.

2:96-cv-00283-DAK

Kimball

No

117

Rawlings v. Gilt Edge Flour Mills

1:07-cv-00031-DAK

Kimball

No

102

Am. Nat. Prop. & Cas. V. McNeely

1:16-cv-00007-DAK

Kimball

No

25

Westport Ins. v. Ong

1:07-cv-00010-DAK

Kimball

Y

50

Utah Div. Forestry v United States

2:97-cv-00927-DAK

Kimball

No

46

Snyder v. Cache Cty.

1:98-cv-00151-DAK

Kimball

No

61

Evans v. State of Utah

2:14-cv-00055-DAK

Kimball

No

145

Schubert v. Genzyme

2:12-cv-00587-DAK

Kimball

No

38

Burns v. Astrue

2:09-cv-00926-DAK

Kimball

Y

128

Carranza v. Mountainlands Health Clinic 2:07-cv-00291-DAK

Kimball

Y

129

Garza v. Burnet

1:06-cv-00134-DAK

Kimball

No

Y

75

Gladwell v. Reinhart

2:08-cv-00562-DAK

Kimball

No

Y

103

Whitney v. Div. of Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 2:09-cv-00030-DAK

Kimball

N

Y

5

In re Simmons

2:13-bk-33821-RKM

Mosier

Y

Hahn v. Reyes

2:16−cv−00666−DN

Nuﬀer

No

80

First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins.

2:15-cv-00229-DN

Nuﬀer

No

26

Utah Republican Party v. Herbert

2:16-cv-00038-DN

Nuﬀer

Y

47

Spurlino v. Holcim

2:14-cv-00461-JNP

Parrish

No

65

Burningham v Wright Med. Grp.

2:17-cv-00092-JNP

Parrish

Loveridge v. Pruden�al Ins. Co. of Am.

2:16-cv-00377-JNP

Parrish

No

Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am.

2:14-cv-00118-JNP

Parrish

Y
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Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t

2:16-cv-00224-JNP

Parrish

Y

60

GeoMetWatch v. Hall

1:14-cv-00060-JNP

Parrish

Y
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HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide

2:16-cv-00135-JNP

Parrish

Y
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Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor

2:14-cv-00785-JNP

Parrish

Y

21
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159
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Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah

2:13-cv-01131-JNP

Parrish

Y
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Equitable Life Ins. v. Research Park

2:87-cv-00866-DS
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No
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Davis Cty. Constr. v. Davis Cty.

1:89-cv-00054-DS
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No

137
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No
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2:16-cv-00905-RJS
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No
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Shelby

Y
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No
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Johnson v. Riddle
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Y
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No
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2:01-cv-00834-TS
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No

141
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2:01-cv-00173-TS

Stewart

Y
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Haik v. Salt Lake Cty. Bd. of Health

2:13-cv-01051-TS
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No
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Anderson v. Toomey

2:07-cv-00673-TS

Stewart

No
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Boyd v. Jones et al.

2:00-cv-00472-TS

Stewart

No
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Haik v. Salt Lake City Corp.

2:12-cv-00997-TS

Stewart

No
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McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.

2:09-cv-00416-TS
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No
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No
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No
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No
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Krehbiel v. Travelers Ins. Co.
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No
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No

Y
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No

Y

31

Waddoups v Noorda
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Y
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Y
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No
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Y
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No
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No
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Appendix—Questions Certified to the Utah Supreme Court

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.
900512
830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992)
Federal Trial Court
Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc.

2:88-cv-00708-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

(1) whether a person not actually threatened with bodily harm who incorrectly but
reasonably believes that he or she is actually threatened with bodily harm has a claim
for negligent inﬂic�on of emo�onal distress that sa�sﬁes the “threat of harm”
requirement of sec�on 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as adopted by
this court in Johnson v. Rogers;
(2) whether a person who witnesses others receiving bodily harm and fears for his or
her own safety, although that person does not comprehend the source of the harm and
therefore does not fear harm from that par�cular source, has a claim for negligent
inﬂic�on of emo�onal distress that sa�sﬁes the “fear for one's own safety”
requirement of sec�on 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), as adopted by
this court in Johnson v. Rogers;
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re W. Side Prop. Assocs.
981425
13 P.3d 168 (Utah 2000)
Federal Trial Court
In re W. Side Prop. Assocs.

97-20887

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does Salt Lake County's assessment of property tax on a building omited from West
Side Property Associates' tax assessment no�ces for 1992 through 1996, when other
buildings and the land were assessed, cons�tute an escaped property assessment as
deﬁned by Utah Code Ann. § 59–2–102(8)(a)(i).1
2. If Salt Lake County's assessment is a valid escaped property assessment, upon what
date was the tax incurred.
94

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Garﬁeld Cty. v. United States
20150335
2017 WL 3187505 (Utah 2017)
Federal Trial Court
Garﬁeld County (1) et al. v. United

2:11-cv-01045-CW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Are Utah Code § 78B–2–201(1) and its predecessor statutes of limita�ons or statutes of
repose?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Garza v. Burnet
20120180
321 P.3d 1104 (Utah 2013)
Federal Trial Court
Garza v. Burnet

1:06-cv-00134-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Under Tenth Circuit decisions at the �me Gerardo Thomas Garza ﬁled his complaint,
approximately two years remained in limita�ons period. A Supreme Court decision soon
a�er ﬁling, however, overturned those decisions and rendered his complaint
approximately ten months late. Under Utah law, does an intervening change in
controlling circuit law merit equitable tolling under these circumstances?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
GeoMetWatch v. Hall
20170264-SC
Federal Trial Court
GeoMetWatch v. Hall

1:14-cv-00060-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Are the Utah State University Research Founda�on and the Utah State University
Advanced Weather Systems Founda�on en�tled to immunity under the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah (“Immunity Act” or the “Act”) as a “public corpora�on” and/or an
“instrumentality of the state?”
2. Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-501 and -502 vest “exclusive, original jurisdic�on over any
ac�on brought under” the Immunity Act in “the district courts” and venue “in the county
in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.” Do these provisions reﬂect an intent by
the State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity to suits
brought in Utah district courts?
3. If ques�on 2 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, does the Oﬃce of the Atorney General
for the State of Utah or any li�gant have authority under Utah law to waive the
jurisdic�onal and venue provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Gibbs v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
20030277-SC
Federal Trial Court
Gibbs v. Unum Life Insurance

2:00-cv-00549-PGC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. In a ﬁrst party insurance situa�on, may an insured recover consequen�al
damages, other than atorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance
contract? If so, what are the consequen�al damages that are recoverable for breach of
the express terms of an insurance contract and how are they dis�nguished from the
consequen�al damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985)?
2. Did Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-26-30 I, en�tled "Timely Payment of Claims," allow
a private cause of ac�on by the insured against his or her insurer for viola�on of the

96

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.
910516
Federal Trial Court
Gines v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.

2:89-cv-00543-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Not available
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.
900573
813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991)
Federal Trial Court
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.

2:89-cv-00274-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Whether Utah adopts the “unavoidably unsafe products” excep�on to strict products
liability as set forth in comment k to sec�on 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1965) (“comment k”).
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
McCourt v. Semken, et al

2:87-cv-01052-BSJ

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

No digital documents available.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 20120158
289 P.3d 502 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus

2:08–cv–00772-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discre�onary review of a
pe��on for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches grounds a decision
“on the merits” when it is accompanied by a writen opinion, such that later
adjudica�on of the same claim is barred?

98

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Haights Creek Irriga. v. United Tech

1:91-cv-00042-DKW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Not available
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.
950280
931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997)
Federal Trial Court
Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp.

2:93-cv-00042-BSJ

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Does the termina�on of a private sector employee in retalia�on for the good faith
repor�ng to company management of the alleged viola�on by one or more co-workers of
computer fraud and embezzlement laws, implicate “a clear and substan�al public
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide 20170591-SC
Federal Trial Court
HealthBanc Int’l v. Synergy Worldwide 2:16-cv-00135-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Does Utah’s economic loss rule apply to a fraudulent inducement claim?
Tenth Circuit
99

Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc.
960180
948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997)
Federal Trial Court
Hirpa v. IHC Hosps., Inc.

1:90-cv-00086-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
(1) Do the provisions of the Utah Good Samaritan Statute, par�cularly Utah Code Ann. §
58–12–23, apply to grant a licensed physician immunity when that physician provides
emergency care at an emergency occurring in a hospital which has employed the
responding physician as its medical director?
(2) If sec�on 58–12–23 does apply in the circumstances appearing here, does the sec�on
violate the Utah Cons�tu�on?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Holden v. N L Indus., Inc.
17159
629 P.2d 428 (Utah 1981)
Federal Trial Court
Holden v NL Indus., Inc.

C-79-0391

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Whether the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workmen's Compensa�on Act, s 35-160, bars plain�ﬀs' claims against defendant-employer, or whether, as an excep�on to
that rule, plain�ﬀs can collect (1) for the tort of fraud, which caused his death, or (2) for
ac�ons, conduct and rela�onships atributable to defendant's status as manufacturer
and supplier independent of its status as an employer, the so-called “dual capacity
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Johnson v. Riddle

2:98-cv-00599-TS

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Is Plain�ﬀ’s Utah Consumer Sales Prac�ces Act (“UCSPA”) claim against
Defendants, who are atorneys, barred by the judicial proceedings privilege when
the claim is based upon collec�on ac�vi�es such as no�ces, phone calls, and
documents made pursuant to a collec�on lawsuit?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp.
990253
8 P.3d 263 (Utah 2000)
Federal Trial Court
Richardson v. Navistar Int’l Transp.

2:95-cv-00752-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Under Utah law, may plain�ﬀs who have entered into a judicially approved setlement
with mul�ple defendants a�er a trial in which a jury allocated 100% of the fault among
the par�es pursuant to the Utah compara�ve fault scheme, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37
to -43, maintain a subsequent tort ac�on for the same injuries, arising out of the same
transac�on or occurrence, against addi�onal known defendants who were not par�es to
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
20130940
359 P.3d 614 (Utah 2015)
Federal Trial Court
Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

1:11-cv-00104-RJS

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Is the right of self-defense a substan�al public policy excep�on to
the at-will employment doctrine, which provides the basis for a
wrongful discharge ac�on?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Reinhart
20091087
267 P.3d 895 (Utah 2011)
Federal Trial Court
Gladwell v. Reinhart

2:08-cv-00562-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Can a Keogh plan be “described in” sec�on 401(a) of the IRC despite failing to fulﬁll that
sec�on's requirements for qualiﬁca�on, thereby en�tling debtor to exempt the plan
from his bankruptcy estate property?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Peterson v. Browning
900401
832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992)
Federal Trial Court
Peterson v. Browning

1:87-cv-00121-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Does an ac�on for termina�on of employment based upon the public policy excep�on
to the employment-at-will doctrine for viola�on of or refusal to violate federal, other
state, or Utah law sound in tort or contract?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Reinhart
20110257
291 P.3d 228 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Gladwell v. Reinhart

2:06-cv-00325-BSJ

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 70C–7–103 create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, or does it only
limit a judgment creditor's garnishment remedy outside bankruptcy?
2. If § 70C–7–103 does create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, do pre-pe��on wages such as
those claimed by the debtor in this case qualify as “disposable earnings” under the
statute?
3. If § 70C–7–103 does create an exemp�on in bankruptcy, and the debtor's pre-pe��on
wages qualify as “disposable earnings” under the statute, do the debts in this case
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Burningham v Wright Med. Grp.

2:17-cv-00092-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.?

Y

1. Under Utah law, does the unavoidably unsafe excep�on to strict products liability in
design defect claims recognized in Comment k to Sec�on 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts apply to implanted medical devices?
2. If the answer to Ques�on 1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, does the excep�on apply
categorically to all implanted medical devices, or does the excep�on apply only to some
devices on a case-by-case basis?
3. If the excep�on applies on a case-by-case basis, what is the proper analysis to
determine whether the excep�on applies?
4. If the answer to Ques�on 1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, does the excep�on require a showing
that such devices were cleared for market through the FDAs premarket approval process
as opposed to the § 510(k) clearance process?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Utah Republican Party v. Cox
20160077
373 P.3d 1286 (Utah 2016)
Federal Trial Court
Utah Republican Party v. Herbert

2:16-cv-00038-DN

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

In interpre�ng Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d), § 20A-9-406(3) and § 20A-9-406(4), does Utah
law require that a QPP permit its members to seek its nomina�on by “either” or "both"
of the methods set forth in § 20A-9-407 and § 20A-9-408, or may a QPP preclude a member
from seeking the party’s nomina�on by gathering signatures under § 20A-9-408?
The statutes that may be at issue include: Utah Code § 20A-9-101(12)(d), Utah Code §
20A-9-406(3), Utah Code § 20A-9-406(4) and Utah Code § 20A-9-401.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp.
20060504
168 P.3d 814 (Utah 2007)
Federal Trial Court
Tabor v. Metal Ware Corp.

2:99-cv-00503-CW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
1. Does Utah law recognize an excep�on to the general rule of successor nonliability
under the circumstances of this case?
2. Does Utah law impose on successor corpora�ons a post-sale duty to independently
warn customers of defects in products manufactured and sold by the predecessor
corpora�on? If so, what factors should determine whether a successor has discharged

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist.
20100648
285 P.3d 1142 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Thayer v. Washington Cty. Sch. Dist.

2:09-cv-00565-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Because the disposi�on of the state immunity claim turns on important and unsetled
ques�ons of Utah law, I cer�fy the following legal ques�on to the Utah Supreme Court:
Considering the facts discussed above, did the conduct of the school district oﬃcials
and those ac�ng on the school district’s behalf cons�tute the issuance of a “permit,
license, cer�ﬁcate, approval, order, or similar authoriza�on” under Utah Code Ann.
§63G-7-301(5)(c) such that the state actors are en�tled to immunity from liability
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
TruGreen Cos., LLC v. Mower Bros.
20070451
199 P.3d 929 (Utah 2008)
Federal Trial Court
TruGreen Cos. v. Biton

1:06-cv-00024-BSJ

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Whether under Utah law a former employer is en�tled to an award of lost proﬁts
damages, or instead an award of res�tu�on or unjust enrichment damages, where a
former employee has breached contractual non-compe��on, non-disclosure, and
employee nonsolicita�on provisions?
2. Whether Utah law recognizes an unjust enrichment measure of damages for tor�ous
interference with a compe�tor’s contractual and economic rela�ons?
3. Whether “actual damages” under Utah Code Ann. § 13-5a-103(1)(b)(i), the Utah
Unfair Compe��on Act, means the plain�ﬀ’s lost proﬁts or an award of damages
deﬁned by the defendant’s revenues?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
U.S. Fid. & Guar. v. U.S. Sports Specialty 20090657
270 P.3d 464 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Nat’l Indem. v. U.S. Sports Specialty

2:07-cv-00996-TS

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does an insurer have a right to reimbursement or res�tu�on against an insured?
2. If an insurer does have a right to reimbursement or res�tu�on against an insured are
there any prerequisites to receiving such a right?
3. And ﬁnally, if such a right exists, does an insurer’s payment in excess of a policy’s
limit impact any such right.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Whitney v. Div. Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 20100983
274 P.3d 906 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Whitney v. Div. Juvenile Jus�ce Servs. 2:09-cv-00030-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? N

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Is a juvenile delinquent placed in a community-based proctor home incarcerated in a
place of legal conﬁnement, such that Utah has not waived its state sovereign immunity
for injuries arising out of, in connec�on with, or resul�ng from his placement, pursuant
to the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Utah Code § 63G–7–301(5)(j)?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Waddoups v Noorda
20120310
321 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2013)
Federal Trial Court
Waddoups v Noorda

1:11-cv-00133-CW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Does sec�on § 78B-3-425 of the Utah Code clarify exis�ng law and therefore retroac�vely
apply to bar negligent creden�aling claims ﬁled prior to its enactment?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah
20160572-SC
2018 WL 523483 (Utah 2018)
Federal Trial Court
Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah

2:13-cv-01131-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Is the Free Speech Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on self-execu�ng?
2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, what are the elements of a claim brought
under the clause?
3. Does an employee who receives no�ce that his or her employment will be terminated
eﬀec�ve on a future date suﬀer an adverse employment ac�on for purposes of the Utah
Protec�on of Public Employees Act when he or she receives the no�ce, when the
employment is actually terminated, or both?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor
20160244
391 P.3d 218 (Utah 2017)
Federal Trial Court
Lancer Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore Motor

2:14-cv-00785-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(a)(v) impose liability on an insured
driver for damages to third par�es resul�ng from the driver’s unforeseeable
loss of consciousness while driving, thereby abroga�ng the common law
principle that liability for personal injury may not be imposed absent fault or
negligence?
2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, is the driver’s liability limited to
the limits of the applicable insurance policy or the applicable minimum
statutory limit?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Gardner v. Galetka
20051029
151 P.3d 968 (Utah 2007)
Federal Trial Court
Gardner v. Galetka

2:95-cv-00846-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

If Gardner had presented the ineﬀec�ve assistance claim at issue in Gardner v. Galetka,
2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263 in State court in a successive pe��on in 1990, would the pe��on
have been procedurally barred?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Scot v Hammock
910112
870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994)
Federal Trial Court
Scot v. Hammock

2:89-cv-00267-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Not available.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Miller v United States
20030054
104 P.3d 1202 (Utah 2005)
Federal Trial Court
Miller v. United States

1:02-cv-00037-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Whether a federal government employee who ordinarily would be immune from suit in
cases of strict liability, may be liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plain�ﬀs
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Westport Ins. v. Ong

1:07-cv-00010-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

I. Under Utah law, can a liability insurance company seek reimbursement of defense
costs from its insured in the absence of a policy provision permi�ng such
reimbursement?
2. If the answer to Ques�on No. I is yes, on what state law theory is the cause of
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

110

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
20030789
116 P.3d 342 (Utah 2005)
Federal Trial Court
Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co.

2:00-cv-00904-PGC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. In a ﬁrst party insurance situa�on, may an insured recover consequen�al
damages, other than atorney's fees, for breach of the express terms of an insurance
contract? If so, what are the consequen�al damages that are recoverable for breach of
the express terms of an insurance contract and how arc they dis�nguished from the
consequen�al damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing that are recoverable under Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 801
(Utah 1985)?
2. Did Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-26-301, en�tled 'Timely Payment of Claims," allow
a private cause of ac�on by the insured against his or her insurer for viola�on of the
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Smith v. United States
No. 20131030
356 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2015)
Federal Trial Court
Smith v. U.S. Dep’t Veterans Aﬀairs

2:12-cv-00968-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does the limita�on on a plain�ﬀs recovery of noneconomic damages in Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-3-410 apply to claims alleging wrongful death caused by medical
malprac�ce?
2. If the answer to Ques�on No.1 is in the aﬃrma�ve, is Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3 410
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t
20170268-SC
Federal Trial Court
Flores v. Uniﬁed Police Dep’t

2:16-cv-00224-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-501 and -502 vest “exclusive, original jurisdic�on over any
ac�on brought under” the Immunity Act in “the district courts” and venue “in the county
in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.” Do these provisions reﬂect an intent by
the State of Utah to limit the Immunity Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity to suits
brought in Utah district courts?
2. If ques�on 1 is answered in the aﬃrma�ve, does the Uniﬁed Police Department of
Greater Salt Lake have authority under Utah law to waive the jurisdic�onal and venue
provisions enacted by the Utah Legislature in the Immunity Act?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Savings
920015
857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993)
Federal Trial Court
Soter's Inc., v. Deseret Fed. Savings

2:89-cv-00979-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Materials are not available.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty.
990553
16 P.3d 533 (Utah 2000)
Federal Trial Court
Spackman v. Bd. Ed. Box Elder Cty.

1:98-cv-00120-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Whether the Free and Equal Public Educa�on Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on (Art. X, § 1)
and/or the Due Process Clause of the Utah Cons�tu�on (Art. I, §7) are self-execu�ng
cons�tu�onal provisions that may be directly enforced without implemen�ng
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins
No. 981732
996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000)
Federal Trial Court
Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins

2:88-cv-00410-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

(1) whether, under Utah law, the negligent acts of a plain�ﬀ in causing or contribu�ng
to the situa�on that the plain�ﬀ hired a professional to resolve can be the basis for
compara�ve or contributory negligence defense; and (2) how a plain�ﬀs negligent acts
in causing or contribu�ng to the situa�on that the plain�ﬀ hired a professional to
resolve can be considered in determining causa�on and damages.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Stoker v. Salt Lake Cty.

2:90-cv-00248-BSJ

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Not available.
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah
No. 910482
853 P.2d 877 (Utah 1993)
Federal Trial Court
Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah 2:87-cv-00330-JTG

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Unknown - documents not available
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Touchard v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.
No. 20050361
148 P.3d 945 (Utah 2006)
Federal Trial Court
Ammons v. La-Z-Boy, Inc.

1:04-cv-00067-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Whether the exercise of rights under the Utah Workers' Compensa�on Act, Utah Code
Ann. §34A-2-101, et. seq., ("UWCA") implicates "a clear and substan�al public policy" of
the State of Utah that would provide a basis for a claim of wrongful termina�on in
viola�on of public policy; and if so,
Whether this cause of ac�on applies in the following circumstances: (a) where the
employee has not ﬁled for beneﬁts under the UWCA but is retaliated against for
opposing an employer's treatment of other injured employees who are en�tled to ﬁle
for beneﬁts under the UWCA; (b) the employee is not ﬁred but resigns under
circumstances that cons�tute a "construc�ve discharge"; and ( c) the employee who has
ﬁled for beneﬁts under the UWCA is neither ﬁred nor construc�vely discharged, but
experiences other discriminatory treatment or harassment from an employer because
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty.
0170324-SC
Federal Trial Court
Katerman v. Salt Lake Cty.

2:13-cv-01122-EJF

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does Utah’s Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code sec�ons 63G-7-101 through -904,
apply to dog bite claims against governmental en��es and their employees brought
pursuant to Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of Owners-Scienter-Dogs Used in Law
Enforcement”?
2. Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-202(3)(a) provides that “an ac�on under this chapter [Utah’s
Governmental Immunity Act] against a governmental en�ty for an injury caused by an act
or omission that occurs during the performance of an employee’s du�es, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plain�ﬀ’s exclusive remedy.” Is the
“exclusive remedy” provision of Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-202(3)(a) preempted or limited
by Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of Owners-Scienter-Dogs Used in Law
Enforcement”?
3. Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-101(2) provides that “[t]he scope of the waivers and
reten�ons of immunity found in this comprehensive chapter: (a) applies to all func�ons
of government, no mater how labeled; and (b) governs all claims against governmental
en��es or against their employees or agents rising out of the performance of the
employee’s du�es, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority.” Does
Utah Code sec�on 63G-7-101(2) apply to dog bite claims against governmental en��es
and employees brought pursuant to Utah Code sec�on 18-1-1, “Liability of OwnersTenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Clark v. Pangan
981694
998 P.2d 268 (Utah 2000)
Federal Trial Court
Clark v. United States

2:98-cv-00304-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"As a mater of Utah state law is it possible for the inten�onal tort of batery to be
within the scope of a person's employment, and if it is possible for batery to be within
the scope of one's employment, what test is to be employed to determine whether the
bater was within the scope of employment."
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Mecham v. Frazier
No. 20070730.
193 P.3d 630 (Utah 2008)
Federal Trial Court
Mecham v. Frazier

1:04-cv-00033-CW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
1. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act confer to state oﬃcers an
immunity from suit (immediately appealable) or merely an immunity from
liability (not immediately appealable)?
2. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act require that a No�ce of
Claim against state oﬃcials in their individual capacity expressly aver
“fraud” or “malice”?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Mitchell v. Roberts
20170447-SC
Federal Trial Court
Mitchell v. Roberts

2:16-cv-00843-EJF

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Can the Utah Legislature expressly revive �me-barred claims through a
statute?
2. Speciﬁcally, does the language of Utah Code sec�on 78B–2–308(7),
expressly reviving claims for child sexual abuse that were barred by the
previously applicable statute of limita�ons as of July 1, 2016, make unnecessary the
analysis of whether the change enlarges or eliminates
vested rights?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Carranza v. United States
20090409
267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2011)
Federal Trial Court
Carranza v. Mountainlands Health

2:07-cv-00291-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an ac�on for the wrongful death of an
unborn child?"
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Burns v. Astrue
20100435
289 P.3d 551 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Burns v. Astrue

2:09-cv-00926-DAK

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"Is a signed agreement to donate preserved sperm to the donor's wife in the event of
his death suﬃcient to cons�tute 'consent[] in a record' to being the 'parent' of a child
conceived by ar�ﬁcial means a�er the donor's death under Utah intestacy law, Utah
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.
20060433-SC
167 P.3d 1058 (Utah 2007)
Federal Trial Court
Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.

2:04-cv-00551-DN

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

First Cer�ﬁca�on (docket no. 277):
1. In a product liability case where a manufacturer's product complies with applicable
government safety standards, should the jury be instructed that a presump�on of nondefec�veness has arisen under Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3)? If so, should the instruc�on
require clear and convincing evidence of a defect to rebut the presump�on, or is proof
by a preponderance of the evidence suﬃcient for rebutal?
2. Does Utah recognize the "enhanced injury" theory of liability outlined in 16(a) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?
Second cer�ﬁca�on (docket no. 330, ﬁled 10/1/2008):
1. Is Utah Code Ann. 78-15-6(3) cons�tu�onal?
2. Does Utah recognize Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 16 (b)-(d)?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex 20050299
144 P.3d 1079 (Utah 2006)
Federal Trial Court
Robert J. DeBry & Assocs. v. Quest Dex 1:03-cv-00099-PGC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
"Whether Defendants violated Utah Code Ann. 13-11a-3(1)(b), (d), or (t) when they
published in their 2003-2004 Ogden -area telephone directory a table of numerical
preﬁxes associated with a 'local calling area' and adver�sements by third par�es that
include a market expansion line telephone number without any physical business
address; and if so, whether Defendants are exempt from liability under Utah Code Ann.

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co.
20160065-SC
2017 WL 4675471 (Utah 2017)
Federal Trial Court
Dircks v. Travelers Indem. Co.

2:14-cv-00118-JNP

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"Does Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-305.3 require that all vehicles covered under the liability
provisions of a motor vehicle insurance policy also be covered under the underinsured
motorist provisions of that policy with equal coverage limits, unless a named insured
signs an acknowledgment form mee�ng the requirements of the statute?"
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Kennard v. Leavit

2:01-cv-00171-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 24–1–15(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Property Protec�on Act authorize a
state court judge to approve a law enforcement oﬃcer's transfer of property in
obedience to a federal forfeiture order, because disobeying the federal order would
place the oﬃcer in jeopardy of being found in contempt and thus “unduly burden” the
oﬃcer for purposes of that provision? For purposes of this ques�on, “federal forfeiture
order” includes a federal court order, federal warrant for arrest in rem, federal agency
administra�ve order, or seizure order obtained by a federal agency.
2. Alterna�vely, does Utah Code Ann. § 24–1–15(2)(a) even require a seizing agency or
prosecu�ng atorney to pe��on a state court to authorize such a transfer when the
seizing agency or prosecu�ng atorney is already under a federal forfeiture order? For
purposes of this ques�on, “federal forfeiture order” includes a federal court order,
federal warrant for arrest in rem, federal agency administra�ve order, or seizure order
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Burkholz v. Joyce
970252
972 P.2d 1235 (Utah 1998)
Federal Trial Court
Burkholz v. Joyce

2:96-cv-00252-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"Whether the excep�onal circumstances version of the discovery rule tolls the
applicable statute of limita�ons, where, during the limita�ons period, the plain�ﬀ's
knowledge of the opera�ve facts underlying his cause of ac�on is interrupted by a
period of psychological repression during which plain�ﬀ is unaware of such facts."
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co v. Unigard Ins. Co.
20090340.
268 P.3d 180 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cloud Nine

1:05-cv-00088-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
Should the defense costs in the EdiZone case be allocated between Ohio Casualty and
Unigard under the “equal shares” method set forth in the “other insurance clause” of
Ohio Casualty's policy, or, in the alterna�ve, because the policies were issued for
successive periods, should those defense costs be allocated using the �me-on-risk
method described in Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
20081016
256 P.3d 222 (Utah 2011)
Federal Trial Court
Iverson v. State Farm Mut. Ins.

1:06-cv-00113-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

How should Utah Code Ann. 31A-22-305(9)(b) and 31A-22-305(9)(h) [now codiﬁed as Utah
Code 31A-22-305.3] be interpreted and applied to the undisputed background facts of
this case?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Simmons
20140514-SC
73
Federal Trial Court
In re Simmons

2:13-bk-33821-RKM

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Is an individual en�tled to a homestead exemp�on under UCA 78B-5-503(2) in
"Property," as deﬁned in UCA 78-5-503(1)(d), that is �tled in the name of a self-setled
revocable trust created by the individual?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Endow v. Utah Transit Auth.
20140024-SC
2015 WL 4394047 (Utah 2015)
Federal Trial Court
Endow v. Utah Transit Auth.

1:13-cv-00108-TC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

"Does the Utah An�discrimina�on Act, Utah Code Ann. 34A-5-101 et seq., provide for
individual liability?"
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Pace v. Swerdlow

2:06-cv-00027-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

To what extent, if any, does Utah law provide witness immunity for retained expert
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court

Federal Trial Court
Novell v. Handleman

2:01-cv-00173-TS

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Does the Utah version of the UCC govern transac�ons involving the
"licensing" of so�ware products (when so�ware is "sold" on computer disks, but the
developer retains the intellectual property rights)?
Does the Utah version of the UCC apply to distribu�on agreements?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Kiley
20170472-SC
Federal Trial Court
In re Kiley

2:15-bk-27838-KA

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. What is the nature and scope of a party's interest in marital property as of the ﬁling
of a divorce complaint -- contrasted with the nature and scope of such interest upon the
entry of a divorce decree alloca�ng such marital property? Stated diﬀerently, upon the
ﬁling for divorce, is a spouse's interest in marital property merely con�ngent,
unliquidated, and inchoate un�l the entry of a divorce decree crea�ng a vested right to
receive a speciﬁc sum of money or a speciﬁc marital asset?
2. Is an individual en�tled to an exemp�on under Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-505(1)(a)(xv) in
money or other assets payable to that individual as an alternate payee under a QDRO?
Stated more simply, is the Debtor en�tled under Utah law to exempt the Re�rement
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Hendry
20170484-SC
Federal Trial Court
In re Hendry

2:14-bk-27398-KA

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

What is the nature and scope of a party's interest in marital property as of the ﬁling of a
divorce complaint -- contrasted with the nature and scope of such interest upon the
entry of a divorce decree alloca�ng such marital property? Stated diﬀerently, upon the
ﬁling for divorce, is a spouse's interest in marital property merely con�ngent,
unliquidated, and inchoate un�l the entry of a divorce decree crea�ng a vested right to
receive a speciﬁc sum of money or a speciﬁc marital asset?
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
Olseth v. Larson
20051180
158 P.3d 532 (Utah 2007)
Federal Trial Court
Olseth v. Salt Lake City Corp.

2:02-cv-01122-CW

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
“Is the statute of limita�ons tolled under Utah Code Ann. § 78–12–35 when a person
against whom a claim has accrued has le� the state of Utah and has no agent within
the state of Utah upon whom service of process can be made instead, but the person is
amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78–27–24?”

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
In re Kunz & In re Rockwell
20030502
99 P.3d 793 (Utah 2004)
Federal Trial Court
In re Kunz & In re Rockwell

2:02-bk-40422-GEC

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

Do funds transferred directly from on exempt account, as described in Utah Code Ann.
78-23-5(1)(a)(x), to another exempt account within one year before a debtor ﬁles
bankruptcy cons�tute "amounts contributed" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. 78Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?
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===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
20170561-SC
Federal Trial Court
CR England v Swi� Transp.

2:14-cv-00781-DB

Dist. Ct. Cert.? Y

Y

1. Does the tort of inten�onal interference with contract require proof of “improper
means”?
2. If so, what cons�tutes “improper means” in the context of tor�ous interference with
Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.?

===========================================================
Utah Supreme Court
McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. No. 20100847
274 P.3d 981 (Utah 2012)
Federal Trial Court
McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. 2:09-cv-00416-TS

Dist. Ct. Cert.? No

Y

Tenth Circuit
Circ. Ct. Cert.? Y
A. Whether an exhaus�on clause, which excludes underinsured motorist
coverage contained in an automobile insurance policy absent a
condi�on precedent, is generally unenforceable in the State of Utah as
contrary to the State’s public policy, to wit:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL:
1. THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY
LIABILITY BONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY
HAVE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF
JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS TO OTHER
PERSONS; OR
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2. SUCH LIMITS OF LIABILITY OR REMAINING PART
OF THEM HAVE BEEN OFFERED TO THE INSURED.
B. Provided that the aforemen�oned exhaus�on clause is not generally
unenforceable in the State of Utah as contrary to the State’s public
policy, whether the enforceability of such clause is con�ngent upon the
insurer establishing actual prejudice to its economic interest.
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Appendix—Methods of Gathering Utah Cases Related to Certification
We attempted to gather every Utah case involving certification and log the cases into a
Microsoft Access database. Contact the author to obtain a copy of the database file.
Explanation of Case Document Locations:
Cases actually certified from one court to another will result in documents in two courts,
the certifying court and the Utah Supreme Court. The procedural history of the case will
affect the number of relevant case documents and their location.
If a case in the federal district court grants certification, there will be a federal district
court case and a Utah Supreme Court case. The case may be appealed to the Tenth Circuit
and the appeal may or may not involve certification. All appeals were listed. If the appeal
involves certification, that was noted. One case originating in district court certified two
questions. Some cases have multiple appeals.
Some cases in the district court deny certification. They have no corresponding case in
the Utah Supreme Court but may have been appealed to the Tenth Circuit. All appeals
were listed. If the appeal involves certification, that was noted.
Cases certified from the Tenth Circuit always have an origination in the Utah federal
District Court and a corresponding case in the Utah Supreme Court. These cases are
interesting because they demonstrate a decision by the Utah federal District Court not to
certify which is thought to be in error by the Tenth Circuit. That error is not usually called
out in the appellate opinion. In some instances, these cases are remanded after the
certification and may be appealed a second time. We did/did not find any interlocutory
appeals/writs mandating certification.
Utah Federal Trial Courts:
To gather Utah federal district court cases, we searched the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah through the electronic filing system CM/ECF using the events Order UT
Supreme Court [cv, misc] and Order on Motion for Certification of Issue to State
Supreme Court [cv, order]. We also searched written opinions for the word “certification”
which yielded some cases and many false positives, because many things are certified in
the district court. A CM/ECF search excludes many older cases because CM/ECF was not
implemented in Utah until May 1 2005. However, some dockets and orders before that
date were imported into CM/ECF. 508

508

The District of Utah provides electronic access to case information on civil cases filed with the Court since July
1989, and criminal cases filed with the court since November 1992. Exceptions include cases that have been sealed
by order of a judge and social security cases. This system permits users to search for a case by entering a party name
or case number. Documents began to be scanned to TIF format, and available electronically on a limited basis in
November 1998. By the year 2000, most documents were being either scanned to PDF or converted electronically to
PDF text format, and available through WebPACER. http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/cmecf-general-information (last
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We also searched CM/ECF docket text only (not case filed documents) for the phrase
“Utah Supreme Court” which also yielded many false positives, but gathered more cases.
(This reveals that the correct CM/ECF events are not always used for certification
orders.) Because this was not a search for CM/ECF filing events, which only began to be
used May 1, 2005, but a search for docket entries, many of which were imported into
CM/ECF, this method of search in CM/ECF went back much further in time, finding
cases as early as 1989.
Similar searches were made in the Utah Bankruptcy Court. However, the method used
did not locate cases in which motions to certify were denied.
Utah Supreme Court:
To locate cases from the Utah Supreme Court, we searched in Westlaw for cases with the
Key Number 170B-3105-3108. There are 37 Utah Cases under this Key Number.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:
To locate cases from the Tenth Circuit, we searched in Westlaw for cases with the Key
Number 170B-3105-3108. We culled the cases from Utah from that group.

visited June 15, 2017). The District went live on CM/ECF with full electronic filing May 1, 2005. “District of Utah
is Live on CM/ECF, May 1, 2005. http://utd-cmecf.blogspot.com/2005/05/ (last visited June 15, 2017).
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